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CIS Comments on TRAI Consultation Paper on Promoting Local Telecom Equipment Manufacturing

sinha — 2017-11-26T02:56:15Z

The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) sent comments to the TRAI Consultation Paper on promoting telecom equipment manufacturing. CIS submission drew primarily from the research done in the Pervasive Technologies project.

Read TRAI's Consultation Paper on Promoting Local Telecom Equipment Manufacturing

Preliminary

This submission presents comments by the Centre for Internet and Society, India ("CIS") on the Consultation Paper on Promoting Local Telecom Equipment Manufacturing dated 18.09. 2017, released by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), under Department of Telecom, Ministry of Communications and Information Technologies (“the TRAI Consultation Paper”).
We commend TRAI for its efforts at seeking inputs from various stakeholders on this important and timely issue and are thankful for the opportunity to put forth our views.
We have addressed questions 3 and 5 of the TRAI Consultation Paper. Question numbers referred to in our submission correspond to those in the TRAI Consultation Paper.
Further, the Department of Industrial Planning and Promotion (DIPP) invited comments on SEPs and their availability on FRAND terms on 01. 03. 2016.[1] CIS submitted a detailed response to the consultation, and our present submission will draw significantly from our earlier response[2], as well as new empirical research concluded in the since the time of the consultation.

About CIS

CIS[3] is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. Our areas of focus include IP rights, openness, internet governance, telecommunication reform, free speech, intermediary liability, digital privacy, cyber-security, and accessibility for persons with diverse abilities.
We strive to maximise public benefit, useful innovation, vibrant competition and consumer welfare. This submission is consistent with our commitment to the domestic goals (as enumerated in Make in India and Digital India), and the protection of India's national interest at the international level.

Submission on the Issues for Resolution

“Q.3 Are the existing patent laws in India sufficient to address the issues of local manufacturers? If No, then suggest the measures to be adopted and amendments that need to be incorporated for supporting the local telecom manufacturing industry.”

We submit that amendments to the Patents Act, 1970 may not be preferred, presently. It may be noted that there have been no judgments concluded by Indian courts on disputes relating to licensing of SEPs, yet. Justice Bakhru’s landmark order in Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) v. Competition Commission of India (2016) provided valuable clarity on the issue of conflict between remedies under Patents Act, 1970 and Competition Act, 1970. As various other matters are yet to be conclusively decided, and given the complex legal questions involved around the interpretation of Patents Act, 1970 and Competition Act, 2002, and constitutional issues around the jurisdiction of regulators and the power of judicial review of the courts, we believe that it would be prudent to examine the ruling of the courts on these issues in some detail, before considering amendments.

However, to support the local telecom manufacturing industry the Government of India may adopt and implement the following measures:

Develop Model Guidelines to improve the working of Indian Standard Setting Organisations (SSOs): Given the increasing complexity and time-consuming nature of SEP litigation in India, there is a tangible threat of the abuse of the FRAND process, it might be useful for the government to make suggestions on the working of Indian SSOs. The functioning of Indian SSOs has not been satisfactory and it is suggested that the government develop Model Guidelines that may be adopted by Indian SSOs, taking into account India specific requirements. The India specific requirements include a large and exponentially growing mobile device market which has made it possible for manufacturers, patent owners and implementers alike to achieve financial gains even with a low margin. We believe that this measure will also enable the fulfillment of the objectives of the Make in India and Digital India initiatives.

We recommend that various stakeholders, including IP holders, potential licensees and users of IP, civil society organizations, academics, and, government bodies, including the Indian Patent Office, the Department of Telecommunications, the DIPP, TRAI, and, the CCI be consulted in the creation of these Model Guidelines.

In our opinion, the Model Guidelines may cover (a) the composition of the SSO; (b) the process of admitting members; (c) the process of the determination of a standard or technical specification; (d) the process of declassification of a standard or technical specification; (e) the IPR Policy; (f) resolution of disputes; (g) applicable law.
Initiate the formation of a patent pool of critical mobile technologies and cap royalty payments: In light of the observed inadequacies in the IPR policies of various SSOs in India, as well the spate of ongoing patent infringement lawsuits around mobile technologies, we recommend that the government intervene in the setting of royalties and FRAND terms by setting up a patent pool of critical mobile technologies and apply a compulsory license with a five per cent royalty. Further, patent pools should be required to offer FRAND licenses on the same terms to both members and nonmembers of the pool.

Our motivations for this proposal are manifold. In our opinion, it is nearly impossible for potential licensees to avoid inadvertent patent infringement. As a part of our research on technical standards applicable to mobile phones sold in India, we have found nearly 322 standards so far.[4] It is submitted that carrying out patent searches for all the standards would be extremely expensive for potential licensees. Further, even if such searches were to be carried out, different patent owners, SSOs and potential licensees disagree on valuation, essentiality, enforceability, validity, and coverage of patents. In addition, some patent owners are non-practising entities and may not be members of SSOs. The patents held by them are not likely to be disclosed. More importantly, homegrown manufacturers that have no patents to leverage and may be new entrants in the market would be especially disadvantaged by such a scenario. Budget phone manufacturers, standing to incur losses either as a result of heavy licensing fees, or, potential litigation, may close down. Alternatively, they may pass on their losses to consumers, driving the now affordable phones out of their financial reach. With the objectives of Make in India and Digital India in sight, it is essential that Indian consumers continue to have access to devices within their purchasing power.

Further, how did we arrive at a cap of 5 percent? The rationale for this figure is the royalty cap imposed by India in the early 1990s. As part of regulating foreign technology agreements, the (former) Department of Industrial Development (later merged with DIPP) capped royalty rates in the early 1990s. Payment of royalties was capped at either a lump sum payment of $2 million, or, 5 percent on the royalty rates charged for domestic sale, and, 8 percent for export of goods pertaining to “high priority industries”.[5] Royalties higher than 5 percent or 8 percent, as the case may be, required securing approval from the government. While the early 1990s (specifically, 1991) was too early for the mobile device manufacturing industry to be listed among high priority industries, the public announcement by the government covered computer software, consumer electronics, and electrical and electronic appliances for home use. The cap on royalty rates was lifted by the DIPP in 2009.[6] It is submitted in the case of mobile device technology, we are witnessing a situation similar to that of the 1990s. In this sphere, most of the patent holders are multinational corporations which results in large royalty amounts leaving India. At the same time, litigation over patent infringement in India has limited the manufacture and sale of mobile devices of homegrown brands. While SEP litigation in India is indeed comparable to international SEP litigation on broader issues raised, specifically competition law concerns, but differs crucially where the parties are concerned. International SEP litigation is largely between multinational corporations with substantial patent portfolios, capable of engaging in long drawn out litigations, or engaging in other strategies including setting off against each other’s patent portfolios. Dynamics in the Indian market differ – with a larger SEP holder litigating against smaller manufacturers, many of whom are indigenous, homegrown.

In June, 2013, we had recommended to the erstwhile Hon’ble Minister for Human Resource Development[7] that a patent pool of essential technologies be established, with the compulsory licensing mechanism. Subsequently, in February, 2015, we reiterated this request to the Hon’ble Prime Minister.[8] We propose that the Government of India initiate the formation of a patent pool of critical mobile technologies and mandate a five percent compulsory license.[9] As we have stated in our request to the Hon’ble Prime Minister, we believe that such a pool would “possibly avert patent disputes by ensuring that the owners' rights are not infringed on, that budget manufacturers are not put out of business owing to patent feuds, and that consumers continue to get access to inexpensive mobile devices. Several countries including the United States issue compulsory licenses on patents in the pharmaceutical, medical, defence, software, and engineering domains for reasons of public policy, or to thwart or correct anticompetitive practices.”[10] We believe that such a measure will not be in breach of our international obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.
Increase transparency in the patent system by making patentees comply with the law: The Patents Act, 1970 requires patentees and licensees to submit a statement on commercial working of the invention to the Controller every year.[11] Form 27 under section 146(2) of the Act lists the details necessary to be disclosed for compliance of the requirement of “working”. A jurisprudential analysis reveals the rationale and objective behind this mandatory requirement. Undeniably, the scheme of the Indian patent regime makes it amply clear that “working” is a very important requirement, and the public as well as competitors have a right to access this information in a timely manner, without undue hurdles. Indeed, as the decision[12] in Natco Pharma v. Bayer Corporation[13] reveals, the disclosures in Form 27 were crucial to determining the imposition of a compulsory license on the patentee. Thus, broadly, Form 27 disclosures can critically enable willing licensees to access patent “working” information in a timely manner.

However, there has been little compliance of this requirement by the patentees, despite the Indian Patent Office (IPO) reiterating the importance of compliance through the issuance of multiple public notices[14] (suo motu and in response to a public interest litigation filed in 2011[15]), and, reminding the patentees that noncompliance is punishable with a heavy fine.[16] Findings of research submitted by one of the parties[17] in the writ of the 2011 public interest litigation Shamnad Basheer v. Union of India and others[18] reveal as follows. First, a large number of Form 27s are unavailable for download from the website of the IPO. This possibly indicates that the forms have either not been filed by the patentees with the IPO, or have not been uploaded (yet) by the IPO. Second, a large number of filings in the telecom sector remain incomplete.

In 2015, CIS queried the IPO website for Form 27s of mobile device patents to arrive at a similar conclusion. We obtained 4,916 valid Form 27s, corresponding to 3,126 mobile device patents from public online records. These represented only 20.1% of all Forms 27 that should have been filed and corresponded to only 72.5% of all mobile device patents for which Forms 27 should have been filed. Forms 27 were missing for almost all patentees, and even among Forms 27 that were obtained, almost none contained useful information regarding the working of the subject patents or fully complying with the informational requirements of the Indian Patent Rules.[19]

Further, in our study, we observed that patentees adopted drastically different positions regarding the definition of patent working, some arguing that importation of products into India or licensing of Indian suppliers constituted working, while others even went so far as to argue that the granting of a worldwide license to a non-Indian firm constituted working in India. Several significant patentees claimed that they or their patent portfolios were simply too large to enable the provision of information relating to individual patents, and instead provided gross revenue and product sale figures, together with historical anecdotes about their long histories in India.

The Indian government has made little or no effort to monitor or police compliance with Form 27 filings, undoubtedly leading to significant non-compliance. We also propose the alteration of the Form 27 template[20] to include more disclosures.[21] Presently, patentees are required to declare number of licensees and sub-licensees. We specifically propose that the format of Form 27 filings be modified to include patent pool licenses, with an explicit declaration of the names of the licensees and not just the number.
Require royalty rates to be decided on the basis of the Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Component: Most modern telecommunication and IT devices are complex with numerous technologies working in tandem. Different studies indicate that the number of patents in the US applicable to smartphones is between 200,000 and 250,000.[22] A comprehensive patent landscape of mobile device technologies conducted by CIS reveals that nearly 4,000 patents are applicable to mobile phones sold in India.[23] It is thus extremely difficult to quantify the exact extent of interaction and interdependence between technologies in any device, in such a way that the exact contribution of the patented technology to the entire device can be determined. Thus, we submit that royalty rates for SEPs should be based on the smallest saleable patent practising component, and not on the net price of the downstream product.

The net cost of the device is almost always several times that of the chipset that implements the patented technology. Armstrong et al[24] have found that the cost of a 4G baseband chip costs up to $20 including royalties in a hypothetical $400 phone sold in the US. One of the litigating parties in the ongoing patent infringement lawsuits in India has stated that one of the reasons for preferring to leverage its patents as downstream as possible in the value chain is that it will earn the company more royalties.[25] In instances where patent exhaustion occurs much earlier in the value chain, such as in the case of the company’s cross-licenses with Qualcomm (another company that owns patents to chip technologies), the company does not try to obtain royalties from the selling prices of devices for the cross-licensed technologies. It is submitted that such market practices could be detrimental to the government’s objectives such as providing a mobile handset to every Indian by 2020 as a part of the Digital India programme.[26] It is also worth noting in this context that the mobile device is the first and only medium of access to the Internet and telecom services for a large number of Indians, and, consequently, the only gateway to access to knowledge, information and critical services, including banking.[27]

“Q.5 Please suggest a dispute resolution mechanism for determination of royalty distribution on FRAND (Fair Reasonable and Non Discriminatory) basis.”

The licensing of SEPs on FRAND terms requires the parties to negotiate “reasonable” royalty rates in good faith, and apply the terms uniformly to all willing licensees. It is our submission that if the parties cannot agree to FRAND terms, they may enter into binding arbitration. Further, if all efforts fail, there exist remedies under the Patents Act and the Competition Act, 2002 to address the issues.

Section 115 of the Patents Act empowers the court to appoint an independent scientific adviser “to assist the court or to inquire and report upon any such question of fact or of opinion (not involving a question of interpretation of law) as it may formulate for the purpose.”[28] Such an independent adviser may inform the court on the technical nuances of the matter.

Further, under the Patents Act, pending the decision of infringement proceedings the Court may provide interim relief, if the plaintiff proves first, a prima facie case of infringement; second, that the balance of convenience tilts in plaintiff’s favour; and, third, that if an injunction is not granted the plaintiff shall suffer irreparable damage. However, it is our suggestion that courts adopt a more cautious stance towards granting injunctions in the field of SEP litigation. First, in our opinion, injunctions may prove to be a deterrent to arrive at a FRAND commitment, in particular, egregiously harming the willing licensee. Second, especially in the Indian scenario, where litigating parties operate in vastly different price segments (thereby targeting consumers with different purchasing power), it is difficult to establish that “irreparable damage” has been caused to the patent owner on account of infringement. Third, we note the approach of the European Court of Justice, which prohibited the patent holder from enforcing an injunction provided a willing licensee makes an offer for the price it wishes to pay to use a patent under the condition that it deposited an amount in the bank as a security for the patent holder.[29] Fourth, we also note the approach of the Federal Trade Commission in the USA, which only authorizes patent holders to seek injunctive relief against potential licensees who have either stated that they will not license a patent on any terms, or refuse to enter into a license agreement on terms that have been set in the final ruling of a court or arbitrator.[30] Further, as Contreras (2015)[31] observes, that the precise boundaries of what constitutes as an unwilling licensee remains to be seen. We observe a similar ambiguity in Indian jurisprudence, and accordingly submit that courts should carefully examine the conduct of the licensee to injunct them from the alleged infringement.

Concluding Remarks

We are thankful to TRAI for the opportunity to make these submissions. It would be our pleasure and privilege to discuss these comments with the TRAI; and, supplement these with further submissions if necessary. We also offer our assistance on other matters aimed at developing a suitable policy framework for SEPs and FRAND in India, and, working towards the sustained innovation, manufacture and availability of mobile technologies in India.

[1] Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion Discussion Paper on Standard Essential Patents and their Availability on Frand Terms, available at /a2k/blogs/discussion-paper-on-standard-essential-patents-and-their-availability-on-frand-terms (last accessed November 13, 2017)

[2] Anubha Sinha, Nehaa Chaudhari and Rohini Lakshane, “CIS’ Comments on Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion Discussion Paper on Standard Essential Patents and their Availability on Frand Terms” (April 23, 2016); available at /a2k/blogs/comments-on-department-of-industrial-policy-and-promotion-discussion-paper-on-standard-essential-patents-and-their-availability-on-frand-terms

[3] www.cis-india.org

[4] Rohini Lakshané, CIS, List of Technical Standards and IP Types (Working document), available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B8SgjShAjhbtaml5eW50bS01d2s/view?usp=sharing (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[5] Kumkum Sen, News on Royalty Payments Brings Cheer in New Year, available at http://www.businessstandard.com/article/economypolicy/newsonroyaltypaymentbringscheerinnewyear11001 0400044_1.html (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[6] See Sanjana Govil, Putting a Lid on Royalty Outflows How the RBI Can Help Reduce India’s IP Costs , available at http://cisindia.org/a2k/blogs/lidonroyaltyoutflows (last accessed 13 November, 2017) for a discussion on the introduction of royalty caps in the early 1990s, and its success in reducing the flow of money out of India.

[7] Nehaa Chaudhari, Letter for Establishment of Patent Pool for Low cost Access Devices through Compulsory

Licenses, available at http://cisindia.org/a2k/blogs/letterforestablishmentofpatentpoolforlowcostaccessdevices (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[8] See Rohini Lakshané, Open Letter to PM Modi, available at http://cisindia.org/a2k/blogs/openlettertoprimeministermodi (last accessed 13 November, 2017) for further details of CIS’ proposal.

[9] Rohini Lakshané, FAQ: CIS’ proposal to form a patent pool of critical mobile technology, September 2015, available at http://cisindia.org/a2k/blogs/faqcisproposalforcompulsorylicensingofcriticalmobiletechnologies (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[10] Id.

[11] Section 146(2) of the Patents Act, 1970.

[12] Sai Vinod, Patent Office Finally Takes Form 27s Seriously, available at http://spicyip.com/2013/02/patentofficefinallytakesform27s.html (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[13] Order No. 45/2013 (Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai), available at http://www.ipab.tn.nic.in/0452013.htm (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[14] Intellectual Property India, Public Notice, available at

http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/publicNotice_Form27_12Feb2013.pdf ((last accessed 13 November, 2017) and Intellectual Property India, Public Notice, available at http://ipindia.nic.in/iponew/publicNotice_24December2009.pdf (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[15] Supra note 11.

[16] Id.

[17] See research findings available at http://spicyip.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/05/FORM27WP1Rcopy.pdf (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[18] In the High Court of Delhi, W.P.(C) 5590/2015. This litigation is currently ongoing. See, illustratively, Mathews P. George, Patent Working in India: Delhi HC issues notice in Shamnad Basheer v. Union of India & Ors. – I , available at http://spicyip.com/2015/09/patentworkinginindiadelhihcissuesnoticeinshamnadbasheervunionofindiaorsi.html (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[19] Contreras, Jorge L. and Lakshané, Rohini and Lewis, Paxton, Patent Working Requirements and Complex Products (October 1, 2017). NYU Journal of Intellectual Property & Entertainment Law, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004283

[20] Form 27, The Patents Act, available at http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/manual/HTML%20AND%20PDF/Manual%20of%20Patent%20Office%20Practice%20and%20Procedure%20%20html/Forms/Form27.pdf (last accessed November 13, 10`7).

[21] However, we came across some complaints raised by patentees and industry observers regarding the structure of the Form 27 requirement - namely, patents covering complex, multi-component products that embody dozens of technical standards and thousands of patents are not necessarily amenable to the individual-level data requested by Form 27. See Contreras, Jorge L. and Lakshané, Rohini and Lewis, Paxton, Patent Working Requirements and Complex Products (October 1, 2017). NYU Journal of Intellectual Property & Entertainment Law, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004283

[22] Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. at 2015 ; See also, for e.g.,

RPX Corporation, Amendment No. 3 to Form Sl,11 Apr. 2011, at 59, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432/000119312511101007/ds1a.htm (last accessed 22 April, 2016), quoting “Based on our research, we believe there are more than 250,000 active patents relevant to today’s

smartphones…” .; See further Steve Lohr, Apple Samsung Case Shows Smartphone as Legal Magnet, New York Times, 25 Aug. 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/technology/applesamsungcaseshowssmartphoneaslawsuitmagnet.html (last accessed November13, 2017).

[23] Jorge L. Contreras and Rohini Lakshané, Patents and Mobile Devices in India: An Empirical Survey, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2756486 (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[24] Ann Armstrong, Joseph J. Mueller and Timothy D. Syrett, The SmartphoneRoyalty Stack:Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components Within Modern Smartphones, available at https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/TheSmartphoneRoyaltyStackArmstrongMuellerSyrett.pdf (last accessed 13 November, 2017)

[25] Florian Mueller, Ericsson Explained Publicly why it Collects Patent Royalties from Device (Not Chipset) Makers, available at http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/01/ericssonexplainedpubliclywhyits.Html (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[26] Romit Guha and Anandita Singh Masinkotia, PM Modi’s Digital India Project:Government to Ensure that Every Indian has a Smartphone by 2019, available at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/20140825/news/53205445_1_digitalindiaindiatodayfinancialservices (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[27] Nehaa Chaudhari, Standard Essential Patents on Low Cost Mobile Phones in India: A Case to Strengthen Competition Regulation? available at http://www.manupatra.co.in/newsline/articles/Upload/08483340C1B94BA4B6A9D6B6494391B8.pdf (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[28] Section 115 of the Patents Act, 1970.

[29] Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp. and ZTE Deutschland , Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 16 July 2015 in GmbH C170/13.

[30] Third Party United States Fed. Trade Commission’s Statement on the Public Interest, In re Certain Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, Computers and Components Thereof, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Inv. No. 337TA745 (Jun. 6, 2012).

[31] Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens , 80 Antitrust Law Journal 39 (2015), available at h ttp://ssrn.com/abstract=2374983 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2374983 (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

For more details visit /telecom/blog/cis-comments-on-promoting-local-telecom-equipment-manufacturing

CIS Submission to TRAI Consultation Note on Model for Nation-wide Interoperable and Scalable Public Wi-Fi Networks

2016-12-12T13:59:00Z

This submission presents responses by the CIS on the Consultation Note on Model for Nation-wide Interoperable and Scalable Public Wi-Fi Networks published by the TRAI on November 15, 2016. Our analysis of the solution proposed in the Note, in brief, is that there is no need of a solution for non-existing interoperability problem for authentication and payment services for accessing public Wi-Fi networks. The proposed solution in this Note only adds to over-regulation in this sector, and does not incentivise new investment in the sector, but only establishes UIDAI and NPCI as the monopoly service providers for authentication and payment services.

The comments were authored by Japreet Grewal, Pranesh Prakash, Sharath Chandra, Sumandro Chattapadhyay, Sunil Abraham, and Udbhav Tiwari, with expert comments from Amelia Andersdotter.

1. Preliminary

1.1. This submission presents responses by the Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) [1] on the Consultation Note on Model for Nation-wide Interoperable and Scalable Public Wi-Fi Networks (“the Note”) published by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (“TRAI”) on November 15, 2016 [2].

1.2. The CIS welcomes the effort undertaken by TRAI to map regulatory and other barriers to deployment of public Wi-Fi in India. We especially appreciate that TRAI has recognised [3] two key barriers to provision of public Wi-Fi networks identified and highlighted in our earlier response to the Consultation Paper on Proliferation of Broadband through Public WiFi [4]: 1) over regulation (including, licensing requirements, data retention, and Know Your Customer policy), and 2) paucity of spectrum [5].

2. General Responses

2.1. Before responding to the specific questions posed by the Note, we would like to make the following observations.

2.2. There is no need of a solution for non-existing interoperability problem for authentication and payment services for accessing public Wi-Fi networks. The proposed solution in this Note only adds to over-regulation in this sector. The proposed solution does not incentivise new investment in the sector, but only establishes UIDAI and NPCI as the monopoly service providers for authentication and payment services.

2.3. As the TRAI has consulted widely with industry and other stakeholders before it settled on the list of priority issues contained in Section C.6 of the Note, we are surprised to find that this Note aims to address only the problem of lack of “seamless interoperable payment system for Wi-Fi networks” (Section C.6.d. Of the Note), and does not discuss and propose solutions for any other key barriers identified by the Note.

2.4. The Note fails to clarify the “interoperability” problem in the payment system for usage of public Wi-Fi networks that it is attempting to solve. The Note identifies that lack of “single standard” for “authentication and payment mechanisms” for accessing public Wi-Fi networks as a key impediment to provide scalable and interoperable public Wi-Fi networks across the country [6]. By conceptualising the problem in this manner, TRAI has bundled together two completely different concerns - authentication and payment - into one and this is at the root of the problems emanating from the proposed solution in this Note.

2.5. Lack of standard process for authentication is created by over-regulation via Know Your Customer (“KYC”) policies, and selection of eKYC service provided by UIDAI as the only acceptable authentication mechanism for all users of public Wi-Fi networks across India, creating further economic and legal challenges for smaller would-be providers of public Wi-Fi networks as they assess their liabilities and start-up costs. Additionally, since this would amount to making UID/Aadhaar enrolment mandatory for any user of public wi-fi networks, it seems to create a contradiction with previously communicated policy from the UIDAI and the Government that no such obligation should arise. Supreme Court has also mandated over successive Orders that enrolment for UID/Aadhaar number should remain optional for the citizens and residents.

2.6. As was observed by the respondents to the TRAI Consultation concluded earlier this year, there is no interoperability problem that needs to be solved regarding payments for accessing public Wi-Fi networks. Payment services continue to be evolved and payment aggregator services provided by existing companies may be expected to resolve many of the outstanding issues of service proliferation in the upcoming years, at least in the absence of additional mandatory technical measures imposed by the government. Bundling of payment with authentication will only undermine the already existing independent market for payment aggregators, and further enforce mandatoriness of UID/Aadhaar number.

2.7. Further, the payment mechanism proposed would seem to worsen difficulties for tourists and foreigners in accessing public Wi-Fi in India, as well adds an additional layer of authentication in a system already identified (even in the Note itself) to be overburdened by regulations regarding KYC and data retention. Section C.6.b of the Note highlights the problems faced by foreigners and tourists when the authentication mechanism is premised upon use of One Time Password (OTP) that requires a functioning local mobile phone number. It contradicts itself later by proposing an authentication method that requires the user to not only download an application onto their mobile/desktop device, but also to enrol for UID/Aadhaar number and/or to use their existing UID/Aadhaar number. Instead of reducing the existing barriers to provision of and access to public Wi-Fi, which the Note is supposed to achieve, it creates significant new barriers.

2.8. The technological architecture advanced by the Note upholds support of governance and surveillance projects that, in addition to being costly in their implementation and thereby slowing down the objective of getting India connected, are also of questionable value to the security of the Indian polity. UID, UPI, and related projects risk undermining cyber-security through their reliance on centralised architectures and interfere with healthy competitive market dynamics between commercial and non-commercial actors.

2.9. The Note continues to only consider and enable commercial models for the provision of public Wi-Fi networks. We have identified this as a problematic assumption in our last submission [7]. It is most crucial that TRAI does not ignore and fail to promote and facilitate the possibility of not-for-profit models that involve grassroot communities, academia, and civil society.

2.10. Last but not the least, the term “Wi-Fi” refers to a particular technology for establishing wireless local area networks. Further, the term is a trademark of the Wi-Fi Alliance [8]. It is this not a neutral term, and it must not be used as a general and universal synonym for wireless local area networks. We recommend that TRAI may consider using a technology-neutral term, say “public wireless services” or “public networking services”, to describe the sector. Following the terminology used in the Note, we have decided to continue using the term “Wi-Fi” in this response. This does not reflect our agreement about the appropriateness of this term. Important: The recommendation for technology-neutral regulation also comes with the qualification that safeguards like regulations on Listen Before Talk and Cycle Time are required to prevent technologies like LTE-U from squatting on spectrum and interfering with connections based on other standards.

3. Specific Responses

Q1. Is the architecture suggested in the consultation note for creating unified authentication and payment infrastructure will enable nationwide standard for authentication and payment interoperability?

3.1. No. The proposed infrastructure is likely to be costly for a large number of actors to implement and undermine some of the ongoing innovation in the Indian digital payment services industry. Rather than being helpful, it risks introducing additional requirements on an industry that TRAI has already identified as facing a number of large challenges.

3.2. There is no need for a unified architecture that provides nationwide standard for authentication and payment interoperability. It does not offer any incentive towards provision of public Wi-Fi networks. Neither is there an interoperability problem at the physical or data link layers that has been pointed out, nor is government mandated interoperability required at the payment or ID layer since there are private entities that provide such interoperability (like, payment aggregators). Additionally, we believe it is inappropriate that the TRAI is trying to predict the most suitable business/technological model for digital payments to be used for accessing commercial Wi-Fi networks. India has a booming online payments industry, and it must be allowed to evolve in an enabling regulatory environment that allow for competition and ensures responsible practices.

3.3. The Note identifies several structural impediments to expansion of public Wi-Fi networks in India, namely paucity of backhaul connectivity infrastructure (Section C.6.a), Inadequate associated infrastructure to offer carrier grade Wi-Fi network (Section C.6.c), dependency of authentication mechanism on pre-existing (Indian) mobile phone connection (Section C.6.b), and limited availability of spectrum to be used for public Wi-Fi networks (Section C.6.e). All these are crucial concerns and none of them have been addressed by the architecture suggested in the Note.

Q2. Would you like to suggest any alternate model?

3.4. Yes. The model proposed in the Note is likely to exclude several types of potential users (say, foreigners and tourists), and impose a single authentication and payment service provider for accessing public Wi-Fi networks, which may undermine both competition and security in the market for these services.

3.5. Internationally, there are cities and regions (say, the city of Barcelona and the Catalonia region in Spain) where public Wi-Fi networks have been provided in a pervasive and efficient manner by taking a light regulatory approach that enables opportunities for potential providers to set up their own infrastructures and additionally have access to backhaul. Further, reducing legal requirements on authentication should be considered in place of government mandated technical architectures for authentication and payment. In particular, allowing for anonymous access to Public Wi-Fi or wireless connectivity would reduce both the administrative and the technical burden on potential providers at the hyper-local level, especially for providers whose main activity it is not, and cannot be, to provide internet services (say, event venues, malls, and shops).

3.6. The CIS suggests the following steps towards conceptualising an “alternative model”:

remove existing regulatory disincentives,
urgently explore policies to promote deployment of wired infrastructures in general, and to enable a larger range of actors, including local authorities, to invest in and deploy local infrastructures by reducing licensing requirements in particular,
examine spectrum requirements for provision of public Wi-Fi, and
provide incentives, such as allowing telecom service providers to share backhaul traffic over public Wi-Fi, and ways for telecom service providers to lower their costs if they also make Internet access available for free.

Q3. Can Public Wi-Fi access providers resell capacity and bandwidth to retail users? Is “light touch regulation” using methods such as “registration” instead of “licensing” preferred for them?

3.7. CIS holds that capacity and bandwidth are neither comparable to tangible goods nor to digital currency. They are a utility, and the provider of the utility has to accept that their customers use the utility in the way they see fit, even if that use entails sharing said capacity and bandwidth with downstream private persons or customers. Wi-Fi capabilities are currently a built-in standardised feature of all consumer routers. Any individual, community, or store with access to an internet connection and a consumer router could become a public Wi-Fi access provider at no additional cost to themselves, furthering the goals of the Indian government in its Digital India strategy to ensure public and universal access to the internet.

3.8. In order to exploit the opportunities awarded by a large amount of entities in the Indian society potentially becoming Public Wi-Fi providers, TRAI should require neither registration nor licensing of these actors. Imposing administrative burdens on potential public Wi-Fi access providers creates legal uncertainty and will cause a lot of actors, who may otherwise contribute to the goals of Digital India, not to do so. This is particularly true for community organisers and citizens, who may not have access to legal assistance and therefore may avoid contributing to the goals of the government.

3.9. Light touch regulation when it comes to both granting license to public Wi-Fi access providers as well as authentication of retail users, however, are needed not only as an exceptional practice for such instances but as a general practice in case of entities offering public Wi-Fi services, either commercially or otherwise. Further, additional laxity in administrative responsibilities is needed to incentivise provision of free, that is non-commercial, public Wi-Fi networks.

Q4. What should be the regulatory guidelines on “unbundling” Wi-Fi at access and backhaul level?

3.10. The Note refers to unbundling of activities related to provision of Wi-Fi but it does not define the term. It is neither explained which specific activities at access and backhaul levels must be considered for unbundling.

3.11. While unbundling should clearly be allowed and any regulatory hurdles to unbundling should be removed, any such decision must be taken with a focus on urgently addressing the stagnated growth in landline and backhaul, as identified in Section C.6.a of the Note. Relying only on spectrum intensive infrastructures, such as mobile base stations, for providing connectivity, creates a heavy regulatory burden for the TRAI, while simultaneously not ensuring optimal connectivity for business and private users. The CIS is concerned that the focus of the Note on standardising a government-mediated authentication and payment mechanism detracts attention from this urgent obstacle to the fulfillment of the Digital India plans of accelerated provision of broadband highways, universal access, and public, especially free, access to internet services.

3.12. From the example of European telecommunications legislations, implementation of policy measures to ensure that vertical integration between infrastructure (say, cables, switches, and hubs) providers and service (say, providing a subscriber with a household modem or a SIM card) providers in the telecommunications sector does not become a barrier to new market entrants has yielded much success in countries that have pursued it, like Sweden and Great Britain.

3.13. Further, there should be no default assumption of bundling by the TRAI. In particular, the TRAI should consider reviewing all regulations that may cause bundling to occur when this is not necessary, and put in place in a monitoring mechanism for ensuring that bundled practises (especially in electronic networks, base station infrastructures, backhaul and similar) do not cause competitive problems or raise market entry barriers [9]. In most EU countries, especially where the corporate structure of incumbent(s) is not highly vertically integrated, interconnection requirements for electronic network providers of wired networks in the backhaul or backbone (effectively price regulated interconnection), and a conscious effort to ensure that new market players can enter the field, have ensured a competitive telecommunications environment. TRAI may consider reviewing the European regulation on local loop unbundling (1999) and discussions on functional separation (especially by the British regulatory authority Ofcom), within an Indian context.

Q5. Whether reselling of bandwidth should be allowed to venue owners such as shop keepers through Wi-Fi at premise? In such a scenario please suggest the mechanism for security compliance.

3.14. Yes. Venue owners should be allowed to provide public Wi-Fi service both on a commercial and non-commercial basis.

3.15. It is not clear from the Note and the question what type of security concerns the TRAI is seeking to address. In terms of payment security, the payment industry already has a large range of verification and testing mechanisms. The CIS objects to the mandatory introduction of the proposed payment system so as to ensure greater security for Wi-Fi access providers and the users.

3.16. As far as hardware-related security issues are concerned, it is again unclear why consumer equipment compliant with existing Wi-Fi standards would not be sufficiently secure in the Indian context. Wi-Fi has proven to be a sturdy technical standard, its adoption is high in multiple jurisdictions around the world, and it also enjoys great technical stability. Similar security assessments could easily be made for alternative wireless technologies, such as WiMaX.

3.17. The CIS foresees problems is in the allocation of risk and liability by law. The already existing legal obligation to verify the identity of each user, for instance, is likely to introduce a large administrative burden on potential Public Wi-Fi providers, which may lead to such potential providers abstaining from entering the market. Should the identification requirement be removed, however, other concerns pertaining to legal obligations may arise. These include liability for user activities on the web or on the internet (cf. copyright infringement, libel, hate speech). We propose a “safe harbour” mechanism in these cases, limiting the liability of the potential public Wi-Fi provider.

Q6. What should be the guidelines regarding sharing of costs and revenue across all entities in the public Wi-Fi value chain? Is regulatory intervention required or it should be left to forbearance and individual contracting?

3.18. The market segments identified by the TRAI in Section F.18 of the Note should normally all be competitive markets themselves, and so do not require regulatory assistance in sharing of costs and revenues. The more elaborate the requirements imposed on each actor of each market segment identified by the TRAI in Section F.18, the more costly the roll-out of public Wi-Fi is going to be for the market actors. Such a cost is not avoided by price regulation.

3.19. The TRAI may instead consider introducing public funding for backhaul roll-out in remote areas, where the market is unlikely to engage in such roll-out on its own. Presently, some Indian states (such as Karnataka) are committing to public funding for wireless access in remote areas. The Union Government can assist such endeavours.

Endnotes

[1] See: /.

[2] See: http://trai.gov.in/Content/ConDis/20801_0.aspx.

[3] See Section C.6 of the Note.

[4] See: http://trai.gov.in/Content/ConDis/20782_0.aspx.

[5] See: /telecom/blog/cis-submission-to-trai-consultation-on-proliferation-of-broadband-through-public-wifi-networks.

[6] See Section E.11. of the Note.

[7] See: /telecom/blog/cis-submission-to-trai-consultation-on-proliferation-of-broadband-through-public-wifi-networks.

[8] See: https://www.wi-fi.org/.

[9] See: Monitoring bundled products in the telecommunications sector is also recommended by the OECD: http://oecdinsights.org/2015/06/22/triple-and-quadruple-play-bundles-of-communication-services-towards-all-in-one-packages/.

For more details visit /telecom/blog/cis-submission-trai-note-on-interoperable-scalable-public-wifi

CIS Submission to TRAI Consultation on Free Data

pranesh — 2016-07-01T16:04:27Z

The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) held a consultation on Free Data, for which CIS sent in the following comments.

The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) asked for public comments on free data. Below are the comments that CIS submitted to the four questions that it posed.

Question 1
Is there a need to have TSP agnostic platform to provide free data or suitable reimbursement to users, without violating the principles of Differential Pricing for Data laid down in TRAI Regulation? Please suggest the most suitable model to achieve the objective.

Is There a Need for Free Data?

No, there is no need for free data, just as there is no need for telephony or Internet. However, making provisions for free data would increase the amount of innovation in the Internet and telecom sector, and there is a good probability that it would lead to faster adoption of the Internet, and thus be beneficial in terms of commerce, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and many other ways.

Thus the question that a telecom regulator should ask is not whether there is a need for TSP agnostic platforms, but whether such platforms are harmful for competition, for consumers, and for innovation. The telecom regulator ought not undertake regulation unless there is evidence to show that harm has been caused or that harm is likely to be caused. In short, TRAI should not follow the precautionary principle, since the telecom and Internet sectors are greatly divergent from environmental protection: the burden of proof for showing that something ought to be prohibited ought to be on those calling for prohibition.

Goal: Regulating Gatekeeping

TRAI wouldn’t need to regulate price discrimination or Net neutrality if ISPs were not “gatekeepers” for last-mile access. “Gatekeeping” occurs when a single entity establishes itself as an exclusive route to reach a large number of people and businesses or, in network terms, nodes. It is not possible for Internet services to reach their end customers without passing through ISPs (generally telecom networks). The situation is very different in the middle-mile and for backhaul. Even though anti-competitive terms may exist in the middle-mile, especially given the opacity of terms in “transit agreements”, a packet is usually able to travel through multiple routes if one route is too expensive (even if that is not the shortest network path, and is thus inefficient in a way). However, this multiplicity of routes is generally not possible in the last mile.¹ This leaves last mile telecom operators (ISPs) in a position to unfairly discriminate between different Internet services or destinations or applications, while harming consumer choice.

However, the aim of regulation by TRAI cannot be to prevent gatekeeping, since that is not possible as long as there are a limited number of ISPs. For instance, even by the very act of charging money for access to the Internet, ISPs are guilty of “gatekeeping” since they are controlling who can and cannot access an Internet service that way. Instead, the aim of regulation by TRAI should be to “regulate gatekeepers to ensure they do not use their gatekeeping power to unjustly discriminate between similarly situated persons, content or traffic”, as we proposed in our submission to TRAI (on OTTs) last year.

Models for Free Data

There are multiple models possible for free data, none of which TRAI should prohibit unless it would enable OTTs to abuse their gatekeeping powers.

Government Incentives For Non-Differentiated Free Data

The government may opt to require all ISPs to provide free Internet to all at a minimum QoS in exchange for exemption from paying part of their USO contributions, or the government may pay ISPs for such access using their USO contributions.

TRAI should recommend to DoT that it set up a committee to study the feasibility of this model.

ISP subsidies

ISP subsidies of Internet access only make economic sense for the ISP under the following ‘Goldilocks’ condition is met: the experience with the subsidised service is ‘good enough’ for the consumers to want to continue to use such services, but ‘bad enough’ for a large number of them to want to move to unsubsidised, paid access.

Providing free Internet to all at a low speed.
1. This naturally discriminates against services and applications such as video streaming, but does not technically bar access to them.
Providing free access to the Internet with other restrictions on quality that aren’t discriminatory with respect to content, services, or applications.

Rewards model

A TSP-agnostic rewards platform will only come within the scope of TRAI regulation if the platform has some form of agreement with the TSPs, even if it is collectively. If the rewards platform doesn’t have any agreement with any TSP, then TRAI does not have the power to regulate it. However, if the rewards platform has an agreement with any TSP, it is unclear whether it would be allowed under the Differential Data Tariff Regulation, since the clause 3(2) read with paragraph 30 of the Explanatory Memorandum might disallow such an agreement.

Assuming for the sake of argument that platforms with such agreements are not disallowed, such platforms can engage in either post-purchase credits or pre-purchase credits, or both. In other words, it could be a situation where a person has to purchase a data pack, engage in some activity relating to the platform (answer surveys, use particular apps, etc.) and thereupon get credit of some form transferred to one’s SIM, or it could be a situation where even without purchasing a data pack, a consumer can earn credits and thereupon use those credits towards data.

The former kind of rewards platform is not as useful when it comes to encouraging people to use the Internet, since only those who already see worth in using in the Internet (and can afford it) will purchase a data pack in the first place. The second form, on the other hand is quite useful, and could be encouraged. However, this second model is not as easily workable, economically, for fixed line connections, since there is a higher initial investment involved.

Recharge API

A recharge API could be fashioned in one of two ways: (1) via the operating system on the phone, allowing a TSP or third parties (whether OTTs or other intermediaries) to transfer credit to the SIM card on the phone which have been bought wholesale. Another model could be that of all TSPs providing a recharge API for the use of third parties. Only the second model is likely to result in a “toll-free” experience since in the first model, like in the case of a rewards platform that requires up-front purchase of data packs, there has to be a investment made first before that amount is recouped. This is likely to hamper the utility of such a model.

Further, in the first case, TRAI would probably not have the powers to regulate such transactions, as there would be no need for any involvement by the TSP. If anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominant position seems to be taking place, it would be up to the Competition Commission of India to investigate.

However, the second model would have to be overseen by TRAI to ensure that the recharge APIs don’t impose additional costs on OTTs, or unduly harm competition and innovation. For instance, there ought to be an open specification for such an API, which all the TSPs should use in order to reduce the costs on OTTs. Further, there should be no exclusivity, and no preferential treatment provided for the TSPs sister concerns or partners.

“0.example” sites

Other forms of free data, for instance by TSPs choosing not to charge for low-bandwidth traffic should be allowed, as long as it is not discriminatory, nor does it impose increased barriers to entry for OTTs. For instance, if a website self-certifies that it is low-bandwidth and optimized for Internet-enabled feature phones and uses 0.example.tld to signal this (just as wap.* were used in for WAP sites and m.* are used for mobile-optimized versions of many sites), then there is no reason why TSPs should be prohibited from not charging for the data consumed by such websites, as long as the TSP does so uniformly without discrimination. In such cases, the TSP is not harming competition, harming consumers, nor abusing its gatekeeping powers.

OTT-agnostic free data

If a TSP decides not to charge for specific forms of traffic (for example, video, or for locally-peered traffic) regardless of the Internet service from which that traffic emanates, as as long as it does so with the end customer’s consent, then there is no question of the TSP harming competition, harming consumers, nor abusing its gatekeeping powers. There is no reason such schemes should be prohibited by TRAI unless they distort markets and harm innovation.

Unified marketplace

One other way to do what is proposed as the “recharge API” model is to create a highly-regulated market where the gatekeeping powers of the ISP are diminished, and the ISP’s ability to leverage its exclusive access over its customers are curtailed. A comparison may be drawn here to the rules that are often set by standard-setting bodies where patents are involved: given that these patents are essential inputs, access to them must be allowed through fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licences. Access to the Internet and common carriers like telecom networks, being even more important (since alternatives exist to particular standards, but not to the Internet itself), must be placed at an even higher pedestal and thus even stricter regulation to ensure fair competition.

A marketplace of this sort would impose some regulatory burdens on TRAI and place burdens on innovations by the ISPs, but a regulated marketplace harms ISP innovation less than not allowing a market at all.

At a minimum, such a marketplace must ensure non-exclusivity, non-discrimination, and transparency. Thus, at a minimum, a telecom provider cannot discriminate between any OTTs who want similar access to zero-rating. Further, a telecom provider cannot prevent any OTT from zero-rating with any other telecom provider. To ensure that telecom providers are actually following this stipulation, transparency is needed, as a minimum.

Transparency can take one of two forms: transparency to the regulator alone and transparency to the public. Transparency to the regulator alone would enable OTTs and ISPs to keep the terms of their commercial transactions secret from their competitors, but enable the regulator, upon request, to ensure that this doesn’t lead to anti-competitive practices. This model would increase the burden on the regulator, but would be more palatable to OTTs and ISPs, and more comparable to the wholesale data market where the terms of such agreements are strictly-guarded commercial secrets. On the other hand, requiring transparency to the public would reduce the burden on the regulator, despite coming at a cost of secrecy of commercial terms, and is far more preferable.

Beyond transparency, a regulation could take the form of insisting on standard rates and terms for all OTT players, with differential usage tiers if need be, to ensure that access is truly non-discriminatory. This is how the market is structured on the retail side.

Since there are transaction costs in individually approaching each telecom provider for such zero-rating, the market would greatly benefit from a single marketplace where OTTs can come and enter into agreements with multiple telecom providers.

Even in this model, telecom networks will be charging based not only on the fact of the number of customers they have, but on the basis of them having exclusive routing to those customers. Further, even under the standard-rates based single-market model, a particular zero-rated site may be accessible for free from one network, but not across all networks: unlike the situation with a toll-free number in which no such distinction exists.

To resolve this, the regulator may propose that if an OTT wishes to engage in paid zero-rating, it will need to do so across all networks, since if it doesn’t there is risk of providing an unfair advantage to one network over another and increasing the gatekeeper effect rather than decreasing it.

Question 2

Whether such platforms need to be regulated by the TRAI or market be allowed to develop these platforms?

In many cases, TRAI would have no powers over such platforms, so the question of TRAI regulating does not arise. In all other cases, TRAI can allow the market to develop such platforms, and then see if any of them violates the Discriminatory Data Tariffs Regualation. For government-incentivised schemes that are proposed above, TRAI should take proactive measure in getting their feasibility evaluated.

Question 3

Whether free data or suitable reimbursement to users should be limited to mobile data users only or could it be extended through technical means to subscribers of fixed line broadband or leased line?

Spectrum is naturally a scarce resource, though technological advances (as dictated by Cooper’s Law) and more efficient management of spectrum make it less so. However, we have seen that fixed-line broadband has more or less stagnated for the past many years, while mobile access has increased. So the market distortionary power of fixed-line providers is far less than that of mobile providers. However, competition is far less in fixed-line Internet access services, while it is far higher in mobile Internet access. Switching costs in fixed-line Internet access services are also far higher than in mobile services. Given these differences, the regulation with regard to price discrimination might justifiably be different.

All in all, for this particular issue, it is unclear why different rules should apply to mobile users and fixed line users.

Question 4

Any other issue related to the matter of Consultation.

None.

In India’s mobile telecom sector, according to a Nielsen study, an estimated 15% of mobile users are multi-SIM users, meaning the “gatekeeping” effect is significantly reduced in both directions: Internet services can reach them via multiple ISPs, and conversely they can reach Internet services via multiple ISPs. See Nielsen, ‘Telecom Transitions: Tracking the Multi-SIM Phenomena in India’, http://www.nielsen.com/in/en/insights/reports/2015/telecom-transitions-tracking-the-multi-sim-phenomena-in-india.html↩

For more details visit /internet-governance/blog/cis-submission-trai-consultation-free-data

The Free Basics debate: Trai has a point in imposing temporary ban on net neutrality

sunil — 2015-12-25T14:58:30Z

The argument against net neutrality in India is simple. Regulation cannot be based on dogma – evidence of harm must be provided before you can advocate for rules for ISPs and telecom operators.

The article was published in FirstPost on December 24, 2015.

But net neutrality regardless of your preferred definition is a very complex regulatory question and there is no global or even national consensus on what counts as relevant evidence. To demonstrate the chain of causality between network neutrality violations and a variety of potential harms - expertise in a wide variety of fields such as economics, competition law, telecom policy, spectrum allocation, communications engineering and traffic management is required. Even with a very large research budget and a multidisciplinary team it would be impossible to predict with confidence what the impact of a particular regulatory option will be on the digital divide or innovation. And therefore the advocates of forbearance say that the Indian telecom regulator — Trai — should not regulate unprecedented technical and business model innovations like Facebook's Free Basics since we don't understand them.

Till recently I agreed with this empirical line of argument. But increasingly I am less convinced that scientific experiment and evidence is the only basis for regulation. Perhaps there is a small but necessary role for principles or ideology. Like the subtitle of Nassim Nicholas Taleb's book, we need to ask: How to Live in a World We Don't Understand. Let us take another area of technological regulation – cyber security. Do we really need to build a centralised database containing the passwords of all netizens and perform scientific experiments on it to establish that it can be compromised? A 100 percent centralised system has a single point of failure and therefore from a security perspective centralisation is almost always a bad idea. How are we so sure that such a system will be compromised at some date? To quote Sherlock Holmes: “Once you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains, no matter how improbable, must be the truth.” Decentralisation eliminates the possibility of a single point of failure thereby growing resilience. The Internet is perhaps the most famous example. It is not necessarily true that all decentralized systems are more secure than all centralised system of a decentralized network but it is usually the case. In other words, the principle of decentralisation in cyber security does not require repeated experimental confirmation across
markets and technologies.

To complicate matters, the most optimal solutions developed using economics and engineering may not be acceptable to most stakeholders. Professor Vishal Misra has provided a Shapley Value solution using cooperative game theory in the multi-sided market to determine how surplus should be divided between three types of ISPs [eyeball, transit and content] and Internet companies using transparent paid transit arrangements. But a migration from the current opaque arrangement to the Misra solution may never happen because Internet companies will resist such proposals and are increasingly getting into access provision themselves through projects like Google Fibre and Loom. Walter Brown from South African Communications Forum proposes that billing by minutes for phone calls and billing by message for SMSes should be prohibited because on 4G networks voice and text messages are carried as data and price is the best signal to consumers to ensure optimum use of network resources. This according to Walter Brown will eliminate the incentive for telcos to throttle or block or charge differently for VOIP traffic. Again this solution will not be adopted by any regulator because regulators prefer incremental changes with the least amount of disruption.

So given that we only have numbers that we can't trust - what should be some of the principles that form the bedrock of our net neutrality policy? To begin with there is the obvious principle of non-discrimination. The premise is simple – anyone who has gate-keeping powers might abuse it. Therefore we need to eliminate the possibility through regulation. Non-exclusivity is the result of non-discrimination and transparency is its precondition. That can also be considered as a principle and now we have three core principles to work with. Maybe that is sufficient since we should keep principles to the bare minimum to keep regulation and compliance with regulation simple. Some net
neutrality experts have also identified fairness and proportionality as additional principles. How do we settle this? Through transparent and participatory policy development as has been the case so far. Once we have principles articulated in law - how can we apply them to a specific case such as Facebook's Free Basics? Through the office of the appropriate regulator. As Chris Marsden advocates, net neutrality regulations should ideally be positive and forward looking. Positive in the sense that there should be more positive obligations and incentives than prohibitions and punitive measures. Forward looking in the sense that that the regulations should not retard or block technological and business model innovations. For example zero-rated walled gardens could be regulated by requiring that promoters such as Facebook also provide 50Mb of data per day to all users of Free Basics and also by requiring that Reliance provides the very same free service to other parties that want to compete with Facebook with similar offerings. Alternatively, users of Free Basics should get access to the whole Internet every other hour. All these proposal ensure that Facebook and it business partners have a incentive to innovate but at the same time ensures that resultant harms are mitigated.

Just to be absolutely clear, my defense of principle based regulation does not mean that I see no role for evidence and research. As regulation gets under way – further regulation or forbearance should be informed by evidence. But lack of evidence of harm is not an excuse for regulatory forbearance. India is the last market on the planet where the walled garden can be bigger than the Internet – and Facebook is sure giving it its very best shot. Fortunately for us Trai has acted and acted appropriately by issuing a temporary prohibition till regulation has been finalised. Like the US, coming up with stable regulation may take 10 years and we cannot let Facebook shape the market till then.

For more details visit /telecom/blog/the-free-basics-debate-trai-has-a-point-in-imposing-temporary-ban-on-net-neutrality

Comments on the DoT Panel Report via MyGov

pranesh — 2015-09-26T10:16:44Z

On behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society, I must commend the Department of Telecom Panel on its report. Overall, it displays a far better understanding of the underlying issues than the TRAI consultation paper did, and is overall a good effort at balancing the different sides. However, some of its most important recommendations are completely off-mark and would be disastrous if accepted by the government.

It is praiseworthy that the panel emphasizes the separation in regulatory terms between the network layer and the service layer. This also means that telecom carriers should be regulated differently from OTT services.

Licensing of Communication OTT Services

The proposal by the DoT panel of a licensing regime for communication OTT services is a terrible idea. It would presumptively hold all licence non-holders to be unlawful, and that should not be the case; as the panel itself notes, apps that lower the cost of communication are a welcome development and should be encouraged by the government and not made presumptively unlawful.

While it is in India's national interest to want to hold VoIP services to account if they do not follow legitimate regulations, it is far better to do this through ex-post regulations rather than an ex-ante licensing scheme.

A licensing scheme would benefit Indian VoIP companies (including services like Hike, which Airtel has invested in) over foreign companies like Viber, or free/open source technologies like WebRTC. The Universal Licence is designed for a world where all the licencees have an operational presence in India. This is not true of communications OTT services. Therefore a licensing regime would unjustly favour some services over others.

Further, VoIP services need not be provided by a company: a person can choose to run XMPP, SIP, or Mumble — all of which are protocol that support VoIP — on their own computers. Will a licensing regime force such individuals' many of whom may not be Indian nationals — to become licence-holders if they facilitate domestic communications within India? The DoT panel report doesn't say. This would also result in a licensing regime unjustly favouring some services over others.

The report also doesn't say how one would distinguish between OTT communication services and OTT application services, when many apps such as personal assistance apps like HelpChat, are centred around communications. It also does not mention what regulatory distinction exists between text communication services and video/voice communication services, or between purely domestic and international video/voice communications. Stating that certain telecom companies are currently earning most of their revenue from domestic voice traffic will not suffice as a regulatory, just as it did not suffice to say that VSNL's international telephony monopoly earned it a lot of money. Regulatory fairness is the important issue and not protecting specific business models. Thus, there is no rational distinction to be drawn. Even if the panel has some regulatory distinction that it has not stated, this is an impossibility to enforce. Much domestic IP traffic is 'round-tripped', with traffic leaving India and coming back in. How would the regulator propose to regulate that?

Will there be a revenue-sharing mechanism, as is currently the case under the Unified Licence? If so, how will it be calculated in case of services like WhatsApp? These questions too find no answer in the report.

Given these numerous objections and unanswered questions, the government would be well-advised not seek to license OTT communications services. Instead, it would be useful for the government to hold public consultations about:

1. What Universal Licence conditions makes sense in the world of IP-based services, and international services?
2. How can we frame ex-post regulations that address legitimate concerns? Is there overlap with provisions of the IT Act such as s.69, s.69B, s.79, and others?
3. How can we ensure that the regulatory burden for telecom players with respect to their being able to provide IP-based services that are equivalent to OTT communication services?

Net neutrality

While the DoT panel reiterates a number of times that the core principles of Net neutrality should be adhered to, it nowhere defines what these core tenets are. We suggest the following definition:

net neutrality is the principle that we should regulate gatekeepers to ensure they do not use their power to unjustly discriminate between similarly situated persons, content or traffic.

The above definition applies to the way the ISPs treat consumers, treat interconnecting networks, as well as the way they treat traffic internally.
We agree with the panel that in that while Net neutrality should find place in a new law, for the time being Net neutrality principles can be enforced through the licence agreement between the DoT and telecom providers.

Traffic Management

It is unclear what precisely the DoT panel means by "application-agnostic" and "application-specific" network management. Different scholars on this issue — such as Barbara van Schewick and Christopher Yoo — mean different things when they use the word "application". Without a definition, it is difficult to say whether the panel's recommendation on that front are sound.
Instead, we suggest the following tests:
Discrimination between classes of traffic for the sake of network management should only be permissible if:

there is an intelligible differentia between the classes which are to be treated differently, and
there is a rational nexus between the differential treatment and the aim of such differentiation, and
the aim sought to be furthered is legitimate, and is related to the security, stability, or efficient functioning of the network, or is a technical limitation outside the control of the ISP, and
the network management practice is the least harmful manner in which to achieve the aim.

As for the provision of enterprise and managed services, which we more broadly term "specialized services", we would recommend:

Provision of specialized services is permitted if and only if it is shown that
The service is available to the user only upon request, and not without their active choice, and
The service cannot be reasonably provided with "best efforts" delivery guarantee that is available over the Internet, and hence requires discriminatory treatment, or
The discriminatory treatment does not unduly harm the provision of the rest of the Internet to other customers.

Lastly, we would recommend that the above regulatory guidlines only be applied against ISPs, and not against public providers of Internet connectivity, such as a library, a school, an airport, a hotel, etc.

Zero-rating

On the contentious issue of zero-rating, a process that involves both ex-ante and ex-post regulation is envisaged to prevent harmful zero-rating, while allowing beneficial zero-rating. Further, the report notes that the supposed altruistic or "public interest" motives of the zero-rating scheme do not matter if they result in harm to competition, distort consumer markets, violate the core tenets of Net neutrality, or unduly benefit an Internet "gatekeeper".

Much of the discussion around zero-rating has been happening around an assumption of common understanding of the phrase. Unfortunately, that is not true. There is no consensus as to whether a "special Facebok pack of 200MB for Rs.20" offered by a telecom company constitutes zero-rating or not. Without a working definition of zero-rating, not much progress can be made.

We propose the following as a definition:

Zero-rating is the practice of not counting (aka "zero-rating") certain traffic towards a subscriber's regular Internet usage.

The zero-rated traffic could be zero-priced or fixed-price; capped or uncapped; subscriber-paid, Internet service-paid, paid for by both, or unpaid; content- or source/destination-based, or agnostic to content or source/destination; automatically provided by the ISP or chosen by the customer.

We believe that zero-rating can be non-discriminatory in nature, and such zero-rating should not be prohibited. Having a system with both ex-ante and ex-post checks is rather heavy-handed regulation, but since the issue is very contentious in India, we believe it might be merited.

We thank you for giving us this opportunity to comment.
Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director at the Centre for Internet and Society

For more details visit /telecom/blog/comments-on-dot-panel-report-via-mygov

Response to TRAI Consultation Paper on Regulatory Framework for Over-the-Top (OTT) Services

pranesh — 2015-05-09T11:27:15Z

The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) sent a joint response to the TRAI Consultation Paper on Regulatory Framework for Over-the-top (OTT) Services with scholars from Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. The response was sent on March 27, 2015.

Executive Summary

The principle objective of net neutrality is that “all the Internet traffic has to be treated equally without any discrimination”; but this has had different interpretations over varied contexts. While the discourse in India has often treated net neutrality as a singular policy construct, we break down net neutrality to its various components. We then individually contextualise each component to the unique characteristics of the Indian telecommunications industry such as dependence on wireless internet access, the fragmented and non-contiguous distribution of spectrum, high competition between TEL-SPs and low digital literacy. The evolving nature of markets and networks are also considered while taking into account various public policy perspectives.

In this submission, we also argue for the need to introduce reasonable regulatory parity between functionally equivalent communications services provided by OTT-SPs and TEL-SPs. We compare the regulations for OTT-SPs under the Information Technology Act 2000 (as amended) with the regulations for TEL-SPs under the Telegraph Act 1885 (as amended), the license agreements (UL, UASL, ISP-L) and TRAI Regulations. Based on an analysis of the current laws and regulations, we suggest how TRAI needs to intervene to create this regulatory parity (for example in areas such as privacy, spam/UCC, interception etc.).

Through the above analysis, we recommend an overall regulatory framework that should be adopted by the Government. The framework takes a nuanced approach to various components of net neutrality, contextualised to India, and also attempts to bring reasonable regulatory parity. Instead of compartmentalising TEL-SPs and OTT-SPs as two distinct actors, the recommended framework considers a two-layered approach which recognises that there is an overlap between TEL-SPs and OTT-SPs. The first layer comprises of network and infrastructure (collectively called the network layer) and the second layer comprises of services and applications (collectively called the service layer).

The framework further divides the service layer into “Non-IP Services”, “Specialised Services” and “Internet Based Services”. The concept of “Specialised Services”, which is borrowed from the European Union, refers to traditional services that have migrated to an IP architecture such as facilities-based VoIP calls to PSTN and IPTV, and are either logically distinct from the Internet or have special needs which the “best efforts” delivery of the general Internet cannot satisfy. This concept helps in applying different evaluation criteria to functionally equivalent “Non-IP Services”, “Specialised Services” and “Internet Based Services”. In the framework, “Specialised Services” are also recognised as an exception to net neutrality. The concept of “Specialised Services” also helps to create an incentive for continued investment in underlying infrastructure by TEL-SPs.

This framework has helped us to bring a more balanced approach from the perspective of both TEL-SPs and OTT-SPs, while also taking into account technological convergence. It has also helped us to bring a more nuanced approach to various issues comprising net neutrality such as zero rating, paid prioritisation etc. We have considered best practices from different international regimes and the pros and cons during implementation in order to determine the exceptions and boundaries of net neutrality that should be adopted in India.

Download the full text of the Response

For more details visit /telecom/blog/joint-response-to-trai-consultation-paper-on-regulatory-framework-for-over-the-top-services

Institute for Internet & Society 2014, Pune

samantha — 2014-04-07T11:31:23Z

Last month, activists, journalists, researchers, and members of civil society came together at the 2014 Institute for Internet & Society in Pune, which was hosted by CIS and funded by the Ford Foundation. The Institute was a week long, in which participants heard from speakers from various backgrounds on issues arising out of the intersection of internet and society, such as intellectual property, freedom of expression, and accessibility, to name a few. Below is an official reporting summarizing sessions that took place.

Day One

February 11, 2014

Time	Detail
9.30 a.m. – 9.40 a.m.	Introduction: Sunil Abraham, Executive Director Centre for Internet and Society
10.00 a.m. – 10.15 a.m.	Introduction of Participants
10.15 a.m. – 12.00 p.m.	Internet Governance and Privacy: Sunil Abraham
12.00 p.m. – 12.30 p.m.	Tea-break
12.30 p.m. – 1.00 p.m.	Keynote: Bishakha Datta, Filmmaker and Activist, and Board Member, Wikimedia Foundation
1.00 p.m. – 2.00 p.m.	Lunch
1.30 p.m. – 3.00 p.m.	Participant Presentations
3.00 p.m. – 3.15 p.m.	Tea Break
3.15 p.m. – 4.45 p.m.	Histories, Bodies and Debates around the Internet: Nishant Shah, Director-Research, CIS

This year’s Internet Institute, hosted by the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS), kicked off in Pune to put a start to a week of learnings and discussions surrounding internet usage and its implications on individuals of society. Twenty two attendees from all over India attended this year, from backgrounds of activism, journalism, research and advocacy work.

Attendees were welcomed by Dr. Ravina Aggarwal, Program Officer for Media Rights & Access at the Ford Foundation, the event’s sponsor, who started off the day by introducing the Foundation’s initiatives in pursuit of bridging the digital divide by addressing issues of internet connectivity.

Internet Governance & Privacy, Sunil Abraham
The Institute’s first session was led by Sunil Abraham, Executive Director of CIS, and engaged with issues of internet governance and privacy with reference to four stories: 1) a dispute between tweeters from the US and those in South Africa over the use of hashtag #thingsdarkiesays, which is said not to be as racially derogatory as it is in the US; 2) Facebook’s contested policies on photos featuring users breastfeeding, 3) a lawsuit between Tata and Greenpeace over the organization’s use of Tata’s logo in a video game created for public criticism of their environmentally-degrading practices, and lastly, 4) the case of Savita Bhabhi, an Indian pornographic cartoon character which had been banned by India’s High Court and which had served as a landmark case in expanding the statutory laws for what is considered to be pornographic.

Each of these stories has one major thing in common: due to their nature of taking place over the internet, they are not confined to one geographic location and in turn, are addressed at the international level. The way by which an issue as such is to be addressed cuts across State policies and internet intermediary bodies to create quite a messy case in trying to determine who is at fault. Such complexity illustrates how challenging internet governance can be within today’s society that is no longer restricted to national or geographic boundaries.

Sunil also goes on in explaining the relationship between privacy, transparency, and power, summing it up in a simple formula; privacy protection should have a reverse relationship to power—the more the power, the less the privacy one should be entitled to. On the contrary, a direct correlation goes for power and transparency—the more the power, the more transparent a body should be. Instead of thinking about these concepts as a dichotomy, Sunil suggests to see them as absolute rights in themselves—instrumental in policies and necessary to address power imbalances.

The Web We Want, Bishakha Datta
The Institute’s kickoff was also joined by Indian filmmaker and activist, Bishakha Datta, who had delivered the keynote address. Bishakha bridged together notions of freedom of speech, surveillance, and accessibility, while introducing campaigns that work to create an open and universally accessible web, such as the Web We Want and Sexuality and Disability. Bishakha stresses how the internet as a space has altered how we experience societal constructs, which can be easily exhibited in how individuals experience Facebook in the occurrence of a death, for example. Bishakha initiated discussion among participants by posing questions such as, “what is our expectation of privacy in this brave new world?” and “what is the society we want?” to encompass the need to think of privacy in a new way with the coming of the endless possibilities the internet brings with it.

Histories, Bodies and Debates around the Internet, Nishant Shah
CIS Research Director, Nishant Shah, led a session examining internet as a technology more broadly, and our understandings of it in relation to the human body. Nishant proposes the idea that history is a form of technology, as well as time, itself, for which our understanding only comes into being with the aid of technologies of measurement. Although we are inclined to separate technology from the self, Nishant challenges this notion while suggesting that technology is very integral to being human, and defines a “cyborg” as someone who is very intimate with technology. In this way, we are all cyborgs. While making reference to several literary pieces, including Haraway’s Cyborg: Human, Animus, Technology; Kevin Warwick’s Living Cyborg; and Watt’s small world theory, Nishant challenges participants’ previous notions of how one is to understand technology in relation to oneself, as well as the networks we find ourselves implicated within.

Also brought forth by Nishant, was the fact that the internet as a technology has become integral to our identities, making us accessible (rather than us solely making the technology accessible) through online forms of documentation. This digital phenomenon in which we tend to document what we know and experience as a means of legitimizing it can be summed in the modern version of an old fable: “If a tree falls in a lonely forest, and nobody tweets it, has it fallen?”

Nishant refers to several case studies in which the use of online technologies has created a sense of an extension of the self and one’s personal space; which can then be subject to violation as one can be in the physical form, and to the same emotional and psychological effect—as illustrated within the 1993 occurrence referred to as “A Rape in Cyberspace.”

Attendee Participation
Participants remained engaged and enthusiastic for the duration of the day, bringing forth their personal expertise and experiences. Several participants presented their own research initiatives, which looked at issues women face as journalists and as portrayed by the media; amateur pornography without the consent of the woman; study findings on the understandings of symptoms of internet addiction; as well as studies looking at how students engage with college confession pages on Facebook.

Day Two

February 12, 2014

Time	Detail
9.30 a.m. – 11.00 a.m.	Wireless Technology: Ravikiran Annaswamy, CEO and Co-founder at Teritree Technologies
11.00 a.m. – 11.15 a.m.	Tea-break
11.15 a.m. – 12.45 p.m.	Wired Technology: Ravikiran Annaswamy
12.45 p.m. – 1.30 p.m.	Lunch
1.30 p.m. – 3.00 p.m.	Network, Threats and Securing Yourself: Kingsley John, Independent Consultant
3.00 p.m. – 3.15 p.m.	Tea Break
3.15 p.m. – 4.45 p.m.	Practical Lab: Kingsley John
4.45 p.m. – 5.00 p.m.	Wrap-up: Sunil Abraham

Day Two of the Institute entailed a more technical orientation to “internet & society” across sessions. Participants listened to speakers introduce concepts related to wired and wireless internet connectivity devices and their networks, along with the network of internet users and how one may secure him or herself while “online.”

Wireless & Wired Technology, Ravikiran Annaswamy
Senior industry practitioner, Ravikiran Annaswamy had aimed to enable the Institute’s participants to “understand the depth and omnipresent of telecom networks” that we find ourselves implicated within. Ravikiran went through the basics of these networks—including fixed line-, mobile-, IP-, and Next Generation IP-networks—as well as the technical structuring of wired and wireless broadband. Many participants found this session to be particularly enriching as their projects aimed to provide increased access to internet connectivity to marginalized areas in India, and had been without the know-how to go about it.

Network, Threats and Securing Yourself, Kinglsey John
An instructional session on how to protect oneself was given by Kingsley John, beginning with a lesson on IP Addresses—what they are and the different generations of such, and how IP addresses fit into a broader internet network. Following, Kingsley demonstrated and explained email encryption through the use of software, Kleopatra, and how it may be used to generate keys to encrypt emails through Thunderbird mail client.

Evening Discussion

A handful of participants voluntarily partook in an evening discussion, looking at the role of big players in the global internet network, such as Google and Facebook, how they collect and utilize users’ data, and what sorts of measures can be taken to minimize the collecting of such. Due to the widely varying backgrounds of interest among participants, those coming from this technical orientation towards the internet were able to inform their peers on relevant information and types of software that may be found useful related to minimizing one’s online presence.

Day Three

February 13, 2014

Time	Detail
9.30 a.m. – 11.00 a.m.	Free Software: Prof. G. Nagarjuna, Chairperson, Free Software Foundation
11.00 a.m. – 11.15 a.m.	Tea-break
11.15 a.m. – 12.45 p.m.	Open Data: Nisha Thompson, Independent Consultant
12.45 p.m. – 1.30 p.m.	Lunch
1.30 p.m. – 3.00 p.m.	Freedom of Expression: Bhairav Acharya, Advocate and Adviser, Centre for Internet and Society
3.00 p.m. – 3.15 p.m.	Tea-break
3.15 p.m. – 4.45 p.m.	Copyright: Nehaa Chaudhari, Program Officer, Centre for Internet and Society

The third day of the Internet Institute incorporated themes presented by speakers ranging from free software, to freedom of expression, to copyright.

Free Software, Prof. G. Nagarjuna
Chairman on the Board of Directors for the Free Software Foundation of India, Professor G. Nagarjuna shared with the Institute’s participants his personal expertise on software freedom. Nagarjuna mapped for us the network of concepts related to software freedom, beginning with the origins of the copyleft movement, and also touching upon the art of hacking, the open source movement, and what role software freedom plays in an interconnected world.

Nagarjuna looks at the free software movement as a political movement in the digital space highlighting the user’s freedoms associated to the use, distribution, and modification of software for the greater good for all. This is said to distinguish this movement from that of Open Source—a technical and more practical development-oriented movement. The free software movement is not set out to compromise the fundamental issues for the sake of being practical and in that sense, ubiquitous. Instead, its objective is “not to make everybody use the software, but to have them understand why they are using the software,” so that they may become “authentic citizens that can also resonate why they’re doing what they’re doing. We want them to understand the ethical and political aspects of doing so,” Nagarjuna says.

Open Data, Nisha Thompson
Participants learned from Nisha Thompson on Open Data; what it is, its benefits, and how it is involved in central government initiatives and policy, as well as civil society groups—generally for uses such as serving as evidence for decision making and accountability. Nisha explored challenges concerning the use of open data, such as those pertaining to privacy, legitimacy, copyright, and interoperability. The group looked at the India Water Portal as a case study, which makes accessible more than 300 water-related datasets already available in the public space for use from anything from sanitation and agriculture to climate change.

Freedom of Expression, Bhairav Acharya
Bhairav Acharya, a constitutional lawyer, traced the development of the freedom of speech and expression in India. Beginning with a conceptual understanding of censorship and the practice of censorship by the state, society, and the individual herself, Bhairav examines the limits traditionally placed by a nation-state on the right to free speech.

In India, modern free speech and censorship law was first formulated by the colonial British government, which broadly imported the common law to India. However, the colonial state also yielded to the religious and communitarian sensitivities of its subjects, resulting in a continuing close link between communalism and free speech in India today. After Independence, the post-colonial Indian state carried forward Raj censorship, but tweaked it to serve to a nation-building and developmental agenda. Nation-building and nationalism are centrifugal forces that attempt to construct a homogenous 'mainstream'; voices from the margins of this mainstream (the geographical, ethnic, and religious peripheries) and of the marginalised within the mainstream (the poor and disadvantaged), are censored.

Within this narrative, Bhairav located and explained the evolution of the law relating to press censorship, defamation, obscenity, and contempt of court. Free speech law applies equally online. Broadly, censorship on the internet must survive the same constitutional scrutiny that is applied to offline censorship; but, as technology develops, the law must innovate.

Copyright, Nehaa Chaudhari
CIS Programme Officer, Nehaa Chaudhari examined the concept of Copyright as an intellectual property right in discussing its fundamentals, purpose and origins, and Copyright’s intersection with the internet. Nehaa also explained the different exceptions to Copyright, along with its alternatives, such as opposing intellectual property protection regimes, including the Creative Commons and Copyleft. Within this session, Nehaa also introduced several cases in which Copyright came into play with the use of the internet, including Hunter Moore’s “Is Anyone Up?” website, which had showcased pornographic pictures obtained by submission bringing rise to the phenomenon of “revenge porn.” Instances as such blur the lines of what is commonly referred to as intellectual property, and what specific requirements enables one to own the rights to such.

Day Four

February 14, 2014

Time	Detail
9.30 a.m. – 11.00 a.m.	E-Accessibility and Inclusion: Prashant Naik, Union Bank
11.00 a.m. – 11.15 a.m.	Tea-break
11.15 a.m. – 12.45 p.m.	Patents: Nehaa Chaudhari
12.45 p.m. – 1.30 p.m.	Lunch
1.30 p.m. – 2.00 p.m.	Fieldwork Assignment

Day Four of the Internet Institute introduced concepts of eAccessibilty and Inclusion on the internet for persons with disabilities, along with patents as an intellectual property right. Participants were also assigned a fieldwork exercise as a hands-on activity in which they were to employ what they’ve learned to initiate conversation with individuals in public spaces and collect primary data while doing so.

eAccessibility and Inclusion, Prashant Naik

Prashant Naik started off the day with his session on E-Accessibility and Inclusion. Prashant illustrated the importance of accessibility and what is meant by the term. Participants learned of assistive technologies for different disability types and how to create more accessible word and PDF documents, as well as web pages for users. Prashant demonstrated to participants what it is like to use a computer as a visually impaired individual, which provided for an enriching experience.

Patents, Nehaa Chaudhari
Nehaa Chaudhari led a second session at the Internet Institute on intellectual property rights—this one looking at patents particularly and their role within statutory law. Nehaa traced the historical origins of patents before examining the fundamentals of them, and addresses the questions, “Why have patents? And is the present system working for everyone?” Nehaa also introduced notions of the Commons along with the Anticommons, and perspectives within the debate around software patents, as well as different means by which the law can address the exploitation of patents or “patent thickets”—such as through patent pools or compulsory licensing.

Fieldwork Assignment, Groupwork
Participants were split into groups and required to carry out a mini fieldwork assignment in approaching individuals in varying public spaces in Pune in attempts to collect primary data. Questions asked to individuals were to be devised by the group, so long as they pertained to themes examined within the Internet Institute. Areas visited by groups included the Pune Central Mall, MG Road, and FC Road.

Day Five

February 15, 2014

Time	Detail
9.30 a.m. – 11.00 a.m.	E-Governance: Manu Srivastav, Vice President, eGovernments Foundation
11.00 a.m. – 11.15 a.m.	Tea-break
11.15 a.m. – 12.45 p.m.	Market Concerns: Payal Malik, Economic Adviser, Competition Commission of India
12.45 p.m. – 1.30 p.m.	Lunch
1.30 p.m. – 3.00 p.m.	Digital Natives: Nishant Shah
3.00 p.m. – 3.15 p.m.	Tea-break
3.15 p.m. – 4.45 p.m.	Fieldwork Presentations

Day Five of the Internet Institute brought with it sessions related to themes of e-governance, market concerns of telecommunications, and so called “Digital Natives.”

eGovernance, Manu Srivastava
Vice President of the eGovernments Foundation, Manu Srivastava led a session on eGovernance—the utilization of the internet as a means of delivering government services communicating with citizens, businesses, and members of government. Manu examined the complexities of the eGovernance and barriers to implementation of eGovernance initiatives. Within discussion, participants examined the nuanced relationship between the government and citizens with the incorporation of other governing bodies in an eGovernance system, as well as new spaces for corruption to take place.

Market Concerns, Payal Malik
Payal Malik, Advisor of the Economics Division of the Competition Commission of India shared her knowledge on market concerns of the telecommunications industry, and exclaimed the importance of competition issues in such an industry as a tool to create greater good for a greater number of people. She demonstrated this importance by stating that affordability as a product of increased access can only be possible once there is enough investment, which generally only happens in a competitive market. In this way, we must set the conditions to make competition possible, as a tool to achieve certain objectives. Payal also demonstrated the economic benefits of telecommunications by stating that for every 10% increase in broadband penetration, increase in GDP of 1.3%. She also examined the broadband ecosystem in India and touched upon future possibilities of increased broadband penetration, such as for formers and the education sector.

Digital Natives, Nishant Shah
Nishant Shah shed some light on one of the areas that the Centre for Internet & Society looks at within their research scope, this being the “Digital Native.” As referred to by Nishant, the Digital Native is not to categorize a specific type of internet user, but can be said for simply any person who is performing a digital action, while doing away with this false dichotomy of age, location, and geography.

Nishant examines varying case studies in which “the digital is empowering natives to not merely be benefactors of change, but agents of change,” from the Blank Noise Project’s “I NEVER Ask for it…” campaign in efforts to rethink sexual violence, to Matt Harding’s foolish dancing with groups of individuals from all over the world.

As occurrences in the digital realm, however, these often political expressions may be rewritten by the network when picked up as a growing phenomenon, in order to make it accessible to online consumers by the masses. In doing so, the expression is removed from its political context and is presented in the form of nothing more than a fad. For this reason, Nishant stresses the need to become aware of the potential of the internet in becoming an “echo-chamber”—in which forms of expression are amplified and mimicked, resulting in a restructuring of the dynamics surrounding the subject—whether it be videos of boys lipsyncing to Backstreet Boys in their dorm room going viral, or a strong and malicious movement to punish the Chinese girl who had taken a video of her heinously and wickedly killing a kitten after locating her using the Human Flesh Search Engine.

Fieldwork Presentations, Groupwork

To end off the day, participant groups presented findings collated from the prior evening’s fieldwork exercise, in which they were to ask strangers in various public places of Pune questions pertaining to themes looked at from within this year’s Institute. Participants were divided into four groups and visited Pune’s FC Road, Mahatma Gandhi Road, and Central Mall.

Groups found that the majority of those interviews primarily accessed the phone via the mobile. There was also a common weariness of using the internet and concern for one’s privacy while doing so, especially with uploading photos to Facebook and online financial transactions. People were also generally concerned about using cyber cafes for fear of one’s accounts being hacked. Generally people suspected that so long as conversations are “private” (i.e. in one’s Facebook inbox), so too are they secure. Just as well, those interviewed shared a sense of security with the use of a password.

Day Six

February 16, 2014

Time	Detail
9.30 a.m. – 11.00 a.m.	Wikipedia: Dr. Abhijeet Safai
11.00 a.m. – 11.15 a.m.	Tea-break
11.15 a.m. – 12.45 p.m.	Open Access: Muthu Madhan (TBC)
12.45 p.m. – 1.30 p.m.	Lunch
1.30 p.m. – 3.00 p.m.	Case Studies Groupwork
3.00 p.m. – 3.15 p.m.	Tea-break
3.15 p.m. – 4.45 p.m.	Case Studies Presentations

As the Institute came closer to its end, participants got the opportunity to hear from speakers on topics pertaining the Wikipedia editing in addition to Open Access to scholarly literature. Participants also worked together in groups to examine specific case studies referenced in previous sessions, and then presented their conclusions.

Wikipedia, Dr. Abhijeet Safai
The Institute was joined by Medical Officer of Clinical Research at Pune’s Symbiosis Centre of Health Care, Dr. Abhijeet Safai, who led a session on Wikipedia. Having edited over 3700 Wikipedia articles, Dr. Abhijeet was able to bring forth his expertise and familiarity in editing Wikipedia to participants so that they would be able to do the same. Introduced within this session were Wikipedia’s different fundamental pillars and codes of conducts to be complied with by all contributors, along with different features and components of Wikipedia articles that one should be aware of when contributing, such as how to cite sources and discuss the contents of an article with other contributors.

Open Access, Muthu Madhan
Muthu Madhan joined the Internet Institute while speaking on Open Access (OA) to scholarly literature. Within his session, Muthu examined the historical context within which the scholarly journal had arisen and how the idea of Open Access began within this space. The presence of Open Access in India and other developing nations was also examined in this session, and the concept of Open Data, introduced.

Case Studies, Groupworks

Participants were split up into groups and assigned particular case studies looked at briefly in previous sessions. Case studies included #thingsdarkiessay, a once trending Twitter hashtag in South Africa which had offended many Americans for its use of “darkie” as a derogatory term; the literary novel, The Hindus, which offers an alternative narrative of Hindu history had been banned in India for obscenity; a case in which several users’ avatars had been controlled by another in a virtual community and forced to perform sexual acts, referred to as A Rape Happened in Cyber Space; and lastly, a pornographic submission website, Is Anyone Up?, for which content was largely derived from “revenge porn.” Each group then presented on the various perspectives surrounding the issue at hand.

The Cyborg, Nishant Shah
Nishant Shah led an off-agenda session in the evening looking more closely at the notion of the human cyborg. Nishant deconstructs humanity’s relationship to technology, in suggesting that we “think of the human as produced with the technologies… not who produces technology.” Nishant explores the Digital Native as an attained identity for those who, because of technology, restructure and reinvent his or her environment—offline as well as online. Among other ideas shared, Nishant refers to works by Haraway on the human cyborg in illustrating our dependency on technology and our need to care for these technologies we depend on.

Day Seven

February 17, 2014

Time	Detail
9.30 a.m. – 11.00 a.m.	Internet Activism: Laura Stein, Associate Professor, University of Texas and Fulbright Fellow
11.00 a.m. – 11.15 a.m.	Tea-break
11.15 a.m. – 12.45 p.m.	Domestic and International Bodies: Chinmayi Arun, Research Director
12.45 p.m. – 1.30 p.m.	Lunch
1.30 p.m. – 3.00 p.m.	Participant Presentations
3.00 p.m. – 3.15 p.m.	Tea-break
3.15 p.m. – 4.45 p.m.	Hot Question Challenge

The last day of the week-long Internet Institute examined concepts of Internet Activism and Domestic and International Bodies. Some participants led presentations on topics of personal familiarity, before a final wrap-up exercise, calling upon individuals to share any new formulations resulting from the Institute.

Internet Activism, Laura Stein

Associate Professor from the University of Texas, Laura Stein, spoke on activism on the internet. Laura examined some grassroots organizations and movements taking place on the online and the benefits that the internet brings in facilitating their impact, such as its associated low costs, accessibility and possibility for anonymity. Despite the positive effects catalyzed by the internet, Laura stresses that the “laying field is still unequal, and movements are not simply transformed by technology.” Some of the websites exemplifying online activism that were examined within this session includes the It Gets Better Project, which aims to give hope to LGBT youth facing harassment, and the national election watch by the Association for Democratic Reforms. Additionally, Laura spoke on public communication policy, comparing that of the US and India, and how this area of policy may influence media content and practice.

Domestic and International Bodies, Chinmayi Arun
As the Internet Institute’s final speaker, Research Director for Communication Governance at National Law University , Chinmayi Arun, explores the network of factors that affect one’s behavior on the internet—these including: social norms, the law, the markets, and architecture. In referring to Lawrence Lessig’s pathetic dot theory, Chinmayi illustrates how individual’s—the pathetic dots in question—are functions of the interactions of these factors, and in this sense, regulated, and stresses the essential need to understand the system, in order to effectively change the dynamics within it. It is worth noting that not all pathetic dots are equal, and Google’s dot, for example, will be drastically bigger than a single user’s, having more leveraging power within the network of internet bodies. Also demonstrated, is the fact that we must acknowledge the need for regulation by the law to some extent, otherwise, the internet would be a black box where anything goes, putting one’s security at risk of violation.

Hot Question Challenge
The very last exercise of the Institute entailed participants asking each other questions on demand, relating back to different themes looked at within the last week. Participants had the chance, here, to bridge together concepts across sessions, as well as formulate their own opinions, while posing questions to others that they, themselves, were still curious about.

For more details visit /telecom/blog/institute-for-internet-society-2014-pune

An Introduction to Spectrum Sharing

beli — 2014-03-20T09:34:06Z

We will look at how current technology – mainly GSM, but also CDMA and touching upon LTE - shares spectrum, how they might share spectrum, the trade-off between spectral (in this case, 'trunking') and 'economic' efficiency in the traditional, purely intra-operator shared scenario, and how it might be overcome by inter-operator sharing.

The Current Scenario – Wi-Fi, GSM and CDMA: A Primer from the Perspective of Spectrum Coordination

Sharing spectrum is not a radically new idea: it's probably being shared in many places in your living room. Your family's phones could be communicating with your laptops using Bluetooth; your Wi-Fi router is sharing Wi-Fi spectrum with your next door neighbor's. There is no central brain that tells each device how to share spectrum, but each device pair (phone+laptop, for example) has some unique identifier (a code) that enables them to hear each other over the “noise” created by the other devices, as though they were speaking different languages. Each device can access the same frequencies at the same time and place, but does not know in advance which other devices are going to use them, and as long as there aren't too many such devices close to each other, the scheme works well.

From a technological standpoint, this is one of two kinds of spectrum coordination that's currently in wide use: the second is where each device is given a narrow sliver of frequency to itself for a specified period of time.[1] This is what happens with GSM cellphone technology: the service provider's tower allocates frequency — from the pool of frequencies available — to users on a per-call basis: this is called Frequency Division Multiple Access, or FDMA. GSM further divides access between different users in the same frequency channel in the time domain with bursts of data of the order of milliseconds, something called Time Division Multiple Access or TDMA; you'd be sharing your frequency channel with up to seven other people[2] and your content would be sent in sub-millisecond bursts approximately every five milliseconds.

Code Division Multiplexing, or CDMA, Is concept that assigns a user a 'code' for the duration of her call that effectively makes interference from other users, with other codes, appear as noise. The following picture illustrates FDMA, TDMA and CDMA:[3]

The preceding discussion would suffice for a single cell tower, alone in a desert. In the real world, there's more than one tower, so we'll have to create a system so that no two adjacent towers end up allocating the same frequency at the same time. The simplest way to do that, and the only one currently used, is splitting the available spectrum such that the range of frequencies available to a tower does not intersect with that available to any of its neighbors, ever – that way, a tower can only allocate from its own set of frequencies, but it need not concern itself with what its neighbors are doing. If adjacent towers were to share spectrum, then the preceding condition only needs to apply at that exact moment in time – at that precise instant a tower should be aware of the frequencies being used by all towers that are close enough to interfere with it, and pick a frequency outside that set, which it can use for the duration of a call.

Frequency Reuse

When there weren't so many cellphones crowding up the spectrum, it did not make economic sense to invest in the extra infrastructure required to make neighboring towers 'talk' to each other with low latency, so the solution we have now, even within the towers of a single service provider, is that any tower's neighbors do not intrude upon the spectrum assigned to that particular tower — what a neighbour is in this statement is qualified below. To start with, let's look at how towers could ideally be placed. We want to place towers on the ground in some regular pattern that makes them end up equidistant from each other: there are as many ways of doing that as there are of tiling a plane, which you can think of as tiling a bathroom with regular shapes (called 'regular polygons' by the pedantic).

Starting from the simplest, we can do it with tiles shaped like triangles, squares or hexagons, and a little thought will convince you that these are the only choices. Since a tower's signal would be 'strong enough' only up to some maximum radius, we'd ideally like to tile our plane with circles, but if we settle for the next best thing, the closest shape to a circle with which to tile the plane is a hexagon, in a honeycomb pattern; if you're looking at it from above, the towers would be placed as in the diagram below.[4]

This is just a part of a much larger honeycomb on the ground; the towers go in the center of the hexagons, where the numbers are; why the numbers are as they are will become clear in a couple of lines. Let's focus at tower 1 in the center of the diagram for our example. If the signals decay slow enough — so that the signals radiated from the nearest neighbors (towers surrounding 1, i.e. 2 through 7) and the next-nearest neighbors (towers two steps away from 1, with numbers from 2 through 7), interfere significantly with tower 1 in the center, but the next-to-next-nearest neighbors (three steps away from 1) do not, then the frequency reuse pattern can be like what we see in the diagram above, with towers denoted by the same number (and only the same number) using same exclusive set of frequencies. In this example, the closest towers with the same frequency as the central tower are the 1's in the hexagons at the edge – the frequency reuse factor is 3 (see footnote). In this diagram, the ordering of the numbers makes no difference – the situation would be the same if we exchanged the position of every, say, 1 and 3.

In reality the grid of towers of a particular operator covering a city is rarely hexagonal, due to local constraints, so what needs to be taken care of is not to use the frequencies that the nearest neighbors, next-nearest neighbors and so on are using depending upon the frequency reuse factor.[5] It's clear that without the towers being able to communicate in near-real time, with and FDMA/TDMA system like GSM, this is the optimal — and, in fact, the only — way to go.

Neighbouring towers sharing spectrum

Everything changes, though, if the towers can communicate and coordinate fast enough — in theory, at least, all the service provider's towers could pick spectrum from a common pool.[6] In fact, every service providers could put their spectrum into a common pool from which frequencies can be allocated to users as before. This would increase trunking efficiency and thereby the maximum number of users per tower dictated by quality of service limits (both terms are defined in the next section), making more efficient use of the spectrum.

The Current Trade-off between Trunking and 'Economic' Efficiency: The Principal Argument for (Inter-operator) Shared Spectrum

Imagine the following scenario:

We have 5 MHz of spectrum split it into five channels of one MHz each;
Five thousand people own cell phones and each is assigned a channel so that there are a thousand cellphone users per channel;
People call infrequently: calls are randomly distributed but on average, in each channel, five people attempt to make a call every minute and each call is ten seconds long.

In this way, a lot of people can use a few channels with a reasonable hope that their calls will be connected, a phenomenon called 'trunking'. Chances are high, however, that at least one person's going to make a call before the previous caller on her channel is done, and end up being blocked. The probability that a call will go through is factored into the Quality of Service (QoS) through the Erlang B Formula; roughly speaking, the less chance there is of a caller being blocked, the higher your QoS. It's essentially a question of queuing: the same logic can be applied to beds at a hospital. The number of hospital beds in a town would be much fewer than the number of people, but it works because everyone's not sick all the time; if people are sick more often, or for longer durations, the chances that someone won't get a bed would be higher:[7]

Suppose someone own an Airtel phone and Airtel's channels are all in use, but Vodaphone has a channel free at the time. Let's look at two alternatives:

a) she's not allowed to switch, and cannot make her call;
b) she's allowed to switch to the empty channel, and her call goes through.

Clearly, the second choice is better — and it has greater trunking efficiency.

In the current scenario, service providers get exclusive rights to chunks of spectrum. Naively, the more competitors (in this case, service providers like Airtel and Vodaphone) you have in a market, the better the competition. This, unfortunately, leads to a decrease in trunking efficiency — it's inversely proportional to the number of players in the market because every chunk of frequencies split between two service providers (every successive split) increases the chances for an event such as the one described above happening. The question that logically follows is: what is the optimal number of service providers for the Indian market? This is hard to find, and differs depending on who you ask — incumbents, for instance, may quote a smaller number, whereas prospective new entrants may quote a larger one. The number is controversial within policy-making circles as well, and is being debated as this article is being written. We note in passing that the number of competitors — and thus fragmentation of spectrum — is higher in the Indian market than most others.

If spectrum were shared, however, all this would be moot. This, therefore, is the primary argument towards spectrum sharing: better trunking efficiency as well as more competition — you can , in this instance, have it both ways.

CDMA and Spectrum Sharing

GSM is a simple example, where both the difficulty and the benefits of intra-operator spectrum sharing are readily apparent. Things get more difficult conceptually if we talk about newer technologies, so we'll have to get a little deeper into the technicalities. Code Division Multiple Access, or CDMA, allows phones to communicate using the same frequencies at the same time and place, but differentiated by codes — similar to WiFi but using different encoding schemes and technology. CDMA might look (from the analogy with Wifi) to require no central planning, but quality of service guarantees require that various phones in a 'cell' coordinate, and the coordinating agent happens to be that cell's tower. Two things need to happen: one, the code allocated to each phone needs to be sufficiently different,[8] at least with respect to other nearby phones, which means the tower has to allocate codes. Additionally, the distance involved between cellphone and tower (as against laptop and router) causes the near-far problem.[9]

For synchronous CDMA, the concept analogous to frequency reuse is code reuse — a tower needs to take into account the codes being used by its nearest neighbors, next-nearest neighbors and so on, which might be easier than coordinating timing in a TDMA system. For asynchronous CDMA (the most commonly used variant), even that is not required — the low cross-correlation pseudorandom codes that are used have so many possibilities that the likelihood of a collision would be small, though other users would appear as gaussian noise, so just like GSM, the number of users is limited by QoS limits. This makes intro-operator sharing of spectrum between adjacent towers easier and asynchronous CDMA ends up with a frequency reuse factor of 1, meaning that a tower can access the same set of frequencies as its (intra-operator) neighbor, hypothetically making it easier to use in a shared-spectrum system.

LTE

LTE uses Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing, or OFDM, which can be – very roughly — thought of as combining ideas used in FDMA as well as CDMA, in that information is redundantly split between several frequencies ('subcarriers' in the literature) and each frequency can have more than one channel, using an orthogonal coding schemes like (synchronous) CDMA, where, as mentioned earlier, a mobile phone can distinguish its channel by its code. As it's an FDMA system, the benefits of frequency sharing for LTE can be inferred as above for GSM.

The Regulatory Perspective

The European Commission has this to say about shared spectrum:[10] “From a regulatory point of view, band sharing can be achieved in two ways: either by the Collective Use of Spectrum (CUS), allowing spectrum to be used by more than one user simultaneously without a license; or using Licensed Shared Access (LSA), under which users have individual rights to access a shared spectrum band”.

CUS is how unlicensed spectrum like Wi-Fi is currently used, which does not require a central 'brain' allocating spectrum to users. It requires no setup or organization before or during use. LSA is what shared spectrum would have to be like when used by service providers: it requires setup and organization but could offer better efficiency and quality of service because the central 'brain' — in this case the CPU at the cellphone tower — can figure out the most efficient way to allocate spectrum to users, just like a city's traffic lights coordinate the flow of traffic to prevent jams, and for that multiple towers — or multiple transmitters on a single tower — would have to coordinate somehow. In other words, you don't require approval before setting up your Wi-Fi router in your living room, but (depending upon the router, how many neighbors have routers, how close they are, and how far you are from your router) your connection might get dropped; this kind of thing is okay because there usually aren't that many people with routers living that close to each other, though that's fast changing. The 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi band is further crowded in by other microwave radio technologies, like Bluetooth and microwave ovens. Cellphones are a different thing altogether, because you wouldn't want your cellphone to stop working in the middle of a crowded bus if you're late en route to meeting someone at a coffee shop, or if you're being mugged and need to call the police. Therefore it is the service providers' and regulatory agencies' responsibility to provide a high (minimum) quality of service. This classification is symbolized by the following diagram:[11]

CUS falls on the left, being contention-based – that is, different user devices (eg, laptops) could contend with each other for the attention of the base station (eg, Wi-Fi router — random access, CSMA), whereas LSA is conflict-free (which would be the case if the router decides, period). The potential for conflict exists in CUS, there being multiple devices asking for spectrum, whereas for LSA, a central authority decides which device to allocate spectrum to at any particular point in space and time. CUS isn't total chaos, however: it would now be appropriate — taking a leaf from ex-FCC chief technology officer Jon M. Peha – to introduce the concepts of coexistence and etiquette.

In our Wi-Fi example, the Wi-Fi routers merely coexist, and the technological standard allows them to try and use the codes/spectral bands that are in their best interests, to best communicate with their client devices (though actual Wi-Fi routers also follow some sort of etiquette with other routers). One could additionally introduce some sort of etiquette into the equation by requiring that one router should, for example, “wait in the cue” for another — and vice versa — as and when required, as well as other requirements for cooperation depending upon the technology used. This minimal cooperation would be enough for them to, in Mr Peha's words, “greatly improve efficiency if and only if designed appropriately for the applications in the band” - depending upon the technology used, being too 'polite' could cause longer wait times that decrease efficiency. The situation is complicated by the existence of multiple technologies at the same spot – for example, your Bluetooth receiver, two-way radio and Wifi router working in the same room. If there is potential for interference, common communication protocols could be implemented to enable all those devices to 'talk' to each other and effectively follow some form of wireless etiquette so that they can cooperate and not get in each others way. This is all the more important as Wi-Fi will become an essential part of the cellphone communication network for 4G.

To conclude, there are many ways shared spectrum technology could hypothetically work, and in practice the core technologies that are used would dictate the details of the spectrum sharing solution. Spectrum sharing would reduce the regulatory conundrum that is spectrum allocation, and make more efficient use of spectrum — most obviously through trunking efficiency, though there may be other technological benefits depending upon the core technology used. For maximum efficiency and robustness, there would have to be some kind of rules followed, so that devices apply for spectrum like people in a cafeteria queue as opposed to the scrum you might find trying to get into an Indian bus; the etiquette we were talking about earlier should be baked into the design of the communication infrastructure. Some services (like voice calling) by their nature, need a guaranteed high QoS — need to be conflict-free — and therefore need Licensed Shared Access. Others need a minimum of regulation — but with the movement of what used to be CUS-appropriate devices (In many plans for 4G LTE-Advanced, specifically Wi-Fi) towards LSA-appropriate applications, a careful optimization needs to be done in deciding where to draw the line.

The Big Question: Infrastructure Sharing

We've gone through a thought experiment on intra- and inter-operator sharing of spectrum for the particular case of mobile towers in adjacent cells, and come to the general conclusion that the solution is in principle a question of fast and efficient coordination between the geographically separated towers, toward which there are two driving forces at present: the demand for more efficient use of spectrum by a growing body of users with growing data needs, and the supply of low latency, cheaper and higher bandwidth communication options using fiber-optic cables.

There are essentially two parts to the big question we're going to ask: one, what happens when there are multiple operators serving the same geographical area, and two, is it necessary to have multiple towers standing right next to each other for multiple operators?

To answer the first question, one could have a 'roaming' agreement between multiple operators at the same spot: if all the channels of one operator are busy, the user just has to switch to a channel of an operator which isn't. For the second, a single tower (the physical tower structure as well as the transmitting equipment on it) could serve any operator, who could rent it's usage on a per-call basis. That, in fact, already seems to be the case: Airtel and Vodaphone, for instance, each own a 42% share in India's largest tower corporation Indus Towers, the remaining 16% belonging to Idea Cellular.

To answer the first question, one could have a 'roaming' agreement between multiple operators at the same spot: if all the channels of one operator are busy, the user just has to switch to a channel of an operator which isn't.

For the second, a single tower (the physical tower structure as well as the transmitting equipment on it) could serve any operator, who could rent it's usage on a per-call basis. That, in fact, already seems to be the case: Airtel and Vodaphone, for instance, each own a 42% share in India's largest tower corporation Indus Towers, the remaining 16% belonging to Idea Cellular.

Infrastructure sharing will be explored further in a forthcoming post.

Coarse-grained Spectrum Sharing

For completeness, we should point out that there are more course-grained (simpler but less efficient) means of sharing in time as well as geography: the appropriate thought experiment is to imagine a radio station at the base of a hill that only has two shows, one for breakfast and one for dinner. Using its radio spectrum on the other side of that hill, or beyond the area it serves, would be fine at anytime; using it's spectrum in between the morning and evening shows would be fine anywhere.

Caveats

It must be emphasized at this point that the above is a purely hypothetical scenario, and not a prescription. Getting this to work would involve technical hurdles that a brief overview such as the one above could not bring up, that could only be discovered in the process of bringing the technology to market. Each technological solution – GSM, CDMA and LTE – would present its own difficulties, which may become apparent only when the product is shipped, so to speak. Fine technical judgments would need to be made: an example of the difficulty involved could be gauged from the early debates comparing the first CDMA standard (IS-95) with GSM at the time.

The economic model to use for shared spectrum and shared infrastructure is also something under intense discussion right now, and a number of scholarly papers have already been written up.

[1]. This is what you'd get in your first few Google search results when you look for “shared spectrum”, because the former has become so widely accepted that it's now part of the linguistic background.

[2]. Explained on http://www.radioraiders.com/gsm-frequency.html, referring to 3GPP spec http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/latest/Rel-7/45_series/45005-7d0.zip

[3]. From http://www.umtsworld.com/technology/cdmabasics.htm

[4]. From Mike Buehrer, William Tranter-Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA)-Morgan & Claypool Publishers (2006).

[5]. There are multiple definitions; the simplest one is “how many steps (in cells) that you have to walk from the tower before you can reuse the frequency”, which will suffice for us.

[6]. Of course, it's going to be messier in practices.

[7]. From http://www.vumc.com/branch/PICA/Software/

[8]. Orthogonal for synchronous CDMA, or 'sufficiently' orthogonal for asynchronous CDMA

[9]. Remember that the receiver on the tower has to demux (split) the signals received from many cellphones, and while a Wifi router would perhaps service multiple laptops in the same building, a CDMA tower has to work for a couple of hundred phones at varying distances – some a building-length away and some, many kilometers away. Every receiver has its own maximum signal to noise ratio, where the strength of the signal received has to be more that a certain fraction (which can be quite small, for a good receiver) of the strength of the electromagnetic (radio) noise it receives from other sources; cellphone towers have to deal with much larger signal to noise ratios than Wifi routers. For an FDMA or TDMA system, different users' data arrives at different frequency or time-slots, so as long as those slots are properly differentiated, one user's signal won't be another user's noise. For the commonly used asynchronous CDMA system, however, this is not the case, so at a receiver on a tower, the signal transmitted by a distant cellphone could be swamped by that from a much closer phone. The way this is dealt with is to have phones closer to the tower decrease their transmission power. So even in CDMA, the tower is still telling the phone what to change, only in this case it's the transmission power as opposed to the exact frequency and time.

[10]. http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/promoting-shared-use-europes-radio-spectrum

[11]. From Mike Buehrer, William Tranter-Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA)-Morgan & Claypool Publishers (2006)

For more details visit /telecom/blog/an-introduction-to-spectrum-sharing

The Supreme Court Delivers

Shyam Ponappa — 2012-12-21T09:57:57Z

Now, the spectrum and licence issues need resolution. On September 27, 2012, the Supreme Court of India delivered the opinion of a bench comprising five Judges on the Presidential Reference regarding the auction of 2G spectrum.

Published in Organizing India Blogspot on October 11, 2012 and in Business Standard on October 4, 2012.

The Supreme Court’s opinion on the Presidential reference[*]dismissed two preposterous claims. One is that it is beyond the ambit of Parliament and the government to formulate economic policies. The second is that the government must allocate resources only through auctions. It’s like the end of a self-destructive nightmare. True, our heedless kleptocracy as a society of rogue politicians, bureaucrats, defence personnel, and complicit citizens, led to this pass. Even so, the anarchic “destructionism” of these claims is as reprehensible as the kleptocracy they seek to tear down. Fortunately, the Supreme Court opinion rose above the populist clamour.

There’s still a mess to clear. The big picture is that the Supreme Court left its decision on spectrum auctions unaddressed. In matters of detail, some points need resolution based on facts. These are discussed below to dispel prevalent myths.

Myth 1: Auctions maximise govt revenues

"Auctions may be the best way of maximising revenue…": paragraph 116 of the opinion. This contravenes the evidence after the National Telecom Policy -99, that revenue-sharing maximises government revenues as well as public benefits. It also ignores the many auction failures.

Consider the evidence: auction revenues foregone were estimated at under Rs 20,000 crore for 1999-2007, because the sector was mired in losses and was unable to provide services effectively or pay those dues. By comparison, actual collections from revenue-sharing by March 2007 were more than double, at Rs 40,000 crore. Collections by March 2010 were Rs 80,000 crore. Current annual contributions to government revenues may be about Rs 18,000 crore on Adjusted Gross Revenues estimated at Rs 1,40,000 crore, plus taxes, amounting to perhaps Rs 36,000 crore.

Re public benefits, access to telephony grew from a few million users in 1999 to about 700 million today (excluding around 250 million shadow subscriptions).

An ameliorating caveat in paragraph 12 states: "…if the State arrives at the conclusion … that maximum revenue would be earned by auction of the natural resource in question, then that alone would be the process", and this is expanded in paragraph 119:

"Where revenue maximisation is not the object of a policy of distribution, the question of auction would not arise. Revenue considerations may assume secondary consideration to developmental considerations."

This has not prevented erroneous conclusions in the press that auctions are the only valid process, notwithstanding that the conditions stipulated in the order, eg, that government’s actions be “fair, reasonable, non-discriminatory”, were always operative, if not adhered to in instances of abuse, as in the 2G scam.

Myth 2: Maximum govt collections are in the public interest

Government collections as the public interest criterion may work for colonial powers extorting revenues from subject states, or possibly for utopias whose political economy is so balanced that such cross-subsidisation works. Developing economies like India presumably can and should seek the welfare of their people. The same populists crusading for maximum government collections accuse governments of corruption and waste. This doesn’t provide a coherent approach to infrastructure, where each capital-intensive sector is configured to deliver a specific service. For instance, the energy sector has to deliver power, while telecommunications must deliver communications services. Neither can be expected to deliver toilets or water. Yet, many well-intentioned people seem to nurture such irrational expectations.

The spectrum and broadband link

The first prerequisite for broadband is high-speed connectivity. The second is reasonably priced services. Our objectives are, therefore: (a) a broadband network, (b) available anywhere (c) at reasonable prices. Our networks are deficient, however, particularly in rural and semi-urban areas. A host of factors are responsible, ranging from limited public sector network rollout, combined with a private sector focus on the most lucrative urban centres, with incentives skewed to voice telephony. Applications need connectivity based on networks that require spectrum.

Problems and solutions

Consider an application like distance education. The need is for networks and services of high quality (followed by the additional requirement of content). What is apparent is that such applications cannot be effective without the connectivity. So we’re back to the need for networks, of fibre where feasible, and wireless elsewhere. This brings us back to the need for spectrum.

Reviewing facts

As regards the facts relating to the 2G judgment deserving review:
The solution the Supreme Court has not considered is that operators need only to use spectrum, for which they can be charged a fee. The evidence of widely available Wi-fi shows that innovation and usage thrive if spectrum is available. The Supreme Court, the government, and the public need to recognise that allocating spectrum to operators is only one way to use spectrum.

There need be no alienation of spectrum at all, if policies allow open access and charge fees. Then, spectrum could be used like any infrastructure network, eg, airports, highways, or rail, on payment of usage charges. The sharing could be in at least two ways. Operators could pool spectrum for collective use. For this, (i) regulations must allow pooling/active facilities sharing, and (ii) operators must agree on terms and procedures. Another way is for mandatory spectrum sharing using the database-driven systems being implemented in the US by Spectrum Bridge and Telcordia. Similar deployments are planned in the UK, the European Union, and in Singapore. The TV white space is shared because this range is available for sharing, and not because other bands cannot be shared.

There are immense societal costs of duplication in capital investments in multiple networks, including the last-mile spectrum access, of operators using dedicated networks with limited passive facilities sharing (such as towers), compared with the benefits of open-access to common networks, if policies changed. These would employ active facilities sharing (equipment, and not just construction) to reduce capital equipment, construction costs, energy for towers, carbon emissions from a more limited physical network, possibly reduced radiation from a rationalised network with small cells with lower-powered equipment, and the multiplier effect on the finite available spectrum.

Enormous productivity benefits could accrue through ICT applications in infrastructure such as smart grids for energy, transportation, education, healthcare, and government services, as well as many commercial applications.

The Supreme Court could also uphold contractual obligations, by discriminating against actual transgressors in the 2G spectrum allocation, while rehabilitating those who operated within the law.

[*].http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/op27092012.pdf

For more details visit /telecom/blog/organizing-india-blogspot-october-11-2012-shyam-ponappa-the-supreme-court-delivers

India's untapped potential: Are a billion people losing out because of spectrum?

Shyam Ponappa — 2012-12-14T10:31:43Z

As one of the world’s fastest growing economies and with over 65% of its billion-plus population under 35, India has huge potential. But according to Shyam Ponappa of the Centre for Internet & Society, its spectrum management – the electromagnetic waves that are used from home appliances like microwaves and remote controls, to radios, cell phones, and of course, the internet – could be a huge barrier to the country’s economic and social development.

Until the global economic downturn that began about two years ago, the economic model for spectrum distribution in India and many developing countries was based on the free market. But Ponappa demonstrates in a new report for APC that spectrum is worth treating as a public utility the way we do roads, electricity and other basic infrastructure, which would allow for people in rural areas to access spectrum-dependant services like mobile phones and wifi and increase quality of services for all.

Currently in India, as in most other countries, spectrum is being treated as a property, where “chunks” of spectrum are sold to the mobile phone and telecommunications operators with the highest bid. Commonly there are 3 – 4 operators in a developed country; however, in India there are up to sixteen. The extreme competition has resulted in the Indian bidders paying outrageous fees that they are never able to recuperate. So while the government makes a profit on the sale, this profit comes at a societal cost.

Ponappa proposes pooling spectrum and to have a set of network providers, who in turn serve operators for retail users. This effectively opens up the spectrum and could make costs ten or fifteen times cheaper than they are now.

“It is appropriate to push the concept of open spectrum in developed markets who underwent their development phase some 60 – 100 years ago and put in place basic infrastructure systems. But in countries like India and the Asian sub-continent, it does not make sense to do this because we are not at the same stage of economic development,” Ponappa told APCNews.

“When markets are well structured and organised,” he continues, “[government control] can be less effective and efficient for society as a whole, compared with open competition. However developing economies don’t have the integrated systems in place that advanced economies do. India does not have an adequately developed network of copper, optical fibre or microwaves covering most of its population. And we are at a stage of development at which infrastructure is a fundamental determinant of productivity, as well as of a reasonable quality of life.”

Ponappa argues that in India’s case it would be advisable for governments to work with other stakeholders – corporations, state-owned agencies, and civil society – on a collaborative solution. “It would be much more conducive to a sound economy to have either the government step in and open up the commercial spectrum, or to have two to three main operators (possibly subsidised, but not necessarily) as we do with the provision of utilities,” he says. Yet, the free market mentality continues to reign, and a surfeit of operators is trying to make a profit in the telecommunications wireless sector.

Everybody wants a piece of the pie

In India, every operator is assigned a sliver of spectrum for their exclusive use and the rest is assigned to the government, the public sector and defence.

The result is high-cost infrastructure for operators (setting up networks with multiple sets of more advanced equipment because of the limited spectrum, with the capital constraints resulting in less extensive networks in rural areas) as well as for users (who have to pay for all this equipment).

“Too many operators make for increased capital costs for each operator, and cumulatively for all operators,” Ponappa explains.

And these higher costs are increasingly difficult to recover from consumer-generated revenue, as India undergoes huge price wars. Many operators may eventually go bankrupt. While no consumers ever complain about low costs –and India has some of the world’s lowest mobile rates– they will complain about poor quality and unreliable service. Consequently, consumers may not have to pay much to use mobile services, but they may not always be able to make or receive calls when they need to, and do not have access to broadband.

While most countries have moved on to 3G networks (which has more capacity for a given spectrum band than 2G, meaning better call quality) as many as four of India’s sixteen operators have not even developed their 2G networks. Making the switch to 3G seems like a good idea, but there are substantial costs associated with deploying these more advanced techniques to both operators (for network upgrades) and for end users (in terms of new handsets).

Too much competition in this case has made operators inefficient.

Spectrum as a national common good

If spectrum were treated as if it were a public utility, posits Ponappa, each operator would have access to a bigger chunk of spectrum, and the traffic-handling capacity of each would increase at a lower cost.

“With the current model the capacity of networks is suffering because networks cannot afford to expand or make technical improvements without economic losses. Other infrastructure services such as electricity and water supply are managed by utility companies, which are typically monopolies for a product-segment, or duopolies for purposes of competition. So why not treat spectrum the same way?” suggests Ponappa.

Ponappa suggests treating networks, and spectrum as a part of networks, as we would an oil pipeline, where everyone accesses the same one, and pays a fee for its use.

This would bring more people onto the network and increase revenues, since operating costs would be shared. The more revenue it can generate, the more efficient operators will be, using the same high-capacity circuits. The more revenue the main operators have, the more they could invest in up-to-date technology to extend their networks and provide a better service to clients. The better the technology, the more people could access the internet and other now vital sources of information, as well as focus on broadband and infrastructure to the country’s isolated rural areas, which today have rudimentary communications infrastructure.

India’s rural populations, the lost resource

As a predominantly rural country, lack of basic IT infrastructure means that the largest segment of India’s population has no access to information and communications technologies.

Ponappa grew up on a farm in a rural area some 200 km from Bangalore where even fixed line phone networks were unreliable. “We have multiple telephone lines because we never know which one will work,” he says.

Given India’s massive rural population, this means that there are hundreds of millions of people that are unable to access the internet. Services like quality distance education are not even an option if basic infrastructure such as fixed telephone lines is not in place and the country itself is losing out on the incalculable potential of this untapped human resource.

Download the report here [pdf - 280 kb]

See the report in the APC website

This article was written as part of the APC’s project work on Spectrum for development, an initiative that aims to provide an understanding of spectrum regulation by examining the situation in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Photo by kiwanja. Used with permission under Creative Content licensing.

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